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Sanaal

INTRODUOTION
There will always be some question as to how the writings
of Ortega y Gasset Should be c1assitied.

Thus tar his work has

been variously designed as philosophical, political, esthetic,
humanist. Ortega considered himselt aa intellectual. l At the
begInning ot his lIterary career he was fond of the name The
Spectator,

and

he himselt detines for us the meaning of this

name: "The spectator has, consequently, a primary purpose: to
raise a bastion against politics for myself and for those who
share my desire for pure vision and for theory-.ft2
Nevertheless, the name Spectator could have been interpret.
ed as a camouflage for a marked political tendency at the beginning of t he twentieth century.

Ortega founded tm

Lea~ue

!:!!. !!!:.

ucation "to study in detail spaniSh life and to closely scrutin-

ize Spaniah society by means of propaganda, critiCism, defense,
protest and the organs ot education, economics and techno1ogYe .. 3
The role that he played in the •• tab118hment ot the Republio and

lort.ga y Gasset, La rebe1ion de las masas (Madrid, 1958),
p.18.
-• 2Ortega, ItEl A8pAc-'t4ildor," Obras Comp1etas, II (Madrid, 1954)

17.

-

-

'orte"ga, "Vie ja y nueva poli tica, n Obras Comp1etaa, I (Mad:rd.d, 1953), 305.

2

later his tenure of office as deputy of Leon, as indications of
his marked interest in politics, despite the fact that he did
not wiSh to enter any party.

Nevertheles8, it could be disput-

ed to What extent he really maintained an interest in politics.
Be

that as it may. his work gives .a prominent place

writings such as: Vieja

1. nueva politica. E!2ana invertebrad.,

None of the principal

critics and commentators ot Ortega

hal denied him the nama of philosopher.
~oh

political

!!. rebel!:oD ~ !!! masas.4

and above all,

stood in

'/:,IC

But this word is under-

a wide aen •• that it doee not add anything to the

name intellectual.

When we restrict the sense of the

wotct

phil-

and apply it to Ortega, we find ourselve. in the midst of a he.ted and interminable polemiC among many critic. ot Ortega, a real
"intellectual intrigue."5
All tho commentators ot Ortega pre.ent What we could call
a systematization

ot hi. thought. Por ortega was not.... and on

this all agree--a 81ltematic thinker.

Be waa tempted, several

time., to write his basic philosophical posItions in a more
schematic tor.a.

But he never did

10.

40bras Completas, IV (Madrid, 1955), 113-312, II (Madrid
1953), 3'7-l31' 1 (Hartd, 1953), 265-307, respectively.
'
5Julian Marias, Ort.g~! tree antipodas (Madrid,
and the article, "Intrlga InteIiCtua! contra Ortega'"
Razon y Fe, CXLIII (1951), 568-591.

1,,,)

3
Althougb artega accepted various Qhalrs ot philoaopbJ-one at the unlverll1ty of Madrid and several in Latin America
Uhiveraitie.--in his classes and writings he lost himselt in
uselesa esthetical digressions.

The speotator has overrun the

philoaopher.
Bowever, the tact that Ortega was an aoaompliabedassayist
adds little to our disousaion exoept that he excelled in thia
literary tom, for he did write literary, philosophiesl,
torical eaaay. ot all typea.

~d.s

From this wealth or literary out-

put one atill oan legitimately gather a philoaopbJ and a political doctrine.
been sald

80

The writer does not intend to overlook what haa
tar about the whole work ot ortega.

BUt the sole

intention at the moment, is to oftel' a new point of view .ot hi.
work. the point of view ot .oaiolog.
There are a number ot works Which indicate a sociology in
Ortega.

The most outstanding of all is SOciolos1a Z politica

!!!. Orte§a l. Gas.et EI.jferhal'l. d_-Rubio. 6 To appreciate the nature
of this work, the term sociology as well as the term political
soienoe must be understood in the European aen..atill prevailing in countries like Spain.

In reality, this book of Hernan-

dea-Rubio is nothing more than a treat! .. on poiitical and social philosapby.

The writer oan ofte# two main reasons tor a systematic approach to the soci logy of Ortega.
6(Baroelona, 1956).

'rhe tirst is that his phil-

4
osoph1eal conclusions are not formulated in an abstract, pure.
ly philosophIcal manner innaoesaible to empirical verilication.
And secondly, if one as 80me critics do, decide. to deny that
ortega is a philosopher 1n the strict sense of the word, then
the majority of his ideas are nothing more than scientifio prepositions, some verified, others to be verified.
the authorities in this matter.

Let us hear

Ferrater Mora says: "The phil-

osophy of Ortega is extraordinaril7 difficult to olassiff be.
cause our writer 1s one of the few who in modern history have
pointed up the problematic oharaoter of philosophical activity/7
And Rubio Hernandez:

"His whole phllosophy Is troubled with a

lack of roots.tt 8 It is pessible"--these are the wOI'de of Iriarte
-."that what 1s gold in the field of humanism and mental aptitude, may be olay in the realm of ph!losophy."9
It, on the oontrary, one would agree with Jullan Marias
who olassifie. ortega as "the greatest philosopher which Spain
has had sinoe sunrez,n10still one would be justified in intraOrtega y Gallet (Buenos Aires, 1958),p. 9.
---8SOo101og1a y politica en Ortega y Gallet (Barcelona, 1956),

7La fl1080£1.

P.l..4..

de

-

-

-

.

9La rut. mental de Ortega (Madrid, 1949). p. 6.
lOphllosopher espae o1s

.2!

notre te!p s (Par!e, 195!d, p. 65.

5
duc1ng into the f1eld of soc1010gy those statements of ortega
whieb are open to empirical verification.

In this case, ortega

should be con.sidered as a philosopher who has made oontributions
to the rield of soc1010gy just as did Hegel, Dilthey, Scheler,

Marx, eto.ll
For many reasons, however, which will be pointed out in
the present work, the writer believes that Ortega'. contribution

to sociology cannot be considered merely in this wide sense.
Vfuil. authors of "grand

theo~1n

~
. ;,

Ii

and metasociologists are

t~eat-

ed iq books of sociolog~eal theory, there seems to be no reason
why

~le

.

work of Ortega

(

lev~t,

~08e

800ial doctrine is empirically re-

L

should be

~

exolu~ed •
.~

The argument in deiJense of this thesis will appear in the
.1
\

first chapter which

wU~

constitute the main proof, and, so to

"~

speak, the major of the syllogism of the thesis.

In this chap-

ter we will discuss the requirements which the works of Ortega,
or anybody else, for this matter, ought to have to merit being
called sooiological.

This will depend on our definition and

ooncept of sooiology and its limits.

The rest of the thesis

will be like the minor ot the s.yllogism.

In ,it one will be

able to Observe how ortega fulfill" the requ.irements set forth 1n
flr.t chapter.
llAs an example of what is meant here t se. Merton's Social
Theot;l: ~ Sooial structure (Glenooe, 1959Jt pp. 456-489-

6
Before beginning the main burden of this thesis a few facts
of the life of ortega are in place.
born in Madrid in

May

of 1883.

Jose Ortega. y Gassetws.s

Consequently, he belonged, at

least chronologically, to the generation of writers who contemplated the final collapse of the Spanish colonial empire in 1898
and dedicated themselves to mourning the death of spain.

"The

rebellion of the masses," says Ortega," and the radical demoralization of humanity is one and the

!!.2!! 9£ 2,2§,

as

srune

_ _--

thlng. tt12 The .......
genera-

it has been named, is a groUp of gloomy writ-

ers whose historical mission, according to them, is to stimulate
the people of their generation doomed to 80cial and political
disalter.
Ortega was born in a house of wri terse
editor of the publication,

!!

His father was the

Imparcia1, a daily newspaper to

which Ortega would later contribute articles.

He

studied in the

boarding school of the Jesuits of' Miraflores del Prado, but later
he

aband~ned

Jesu.its. 1 3

the faith,
In

attac~d

1904, he received

humanities in Madrid.

the Church and especially the
his doctorate of philosophy snd

Afterwards, he carried on the studies in

Germany, and the influence; of the German 11.fer made a gr&at 1m,I:.

I2 La rebelion de la s masas (Madrid, 195·8). p. 109
_

I

_ _. . . . . .

_ __

l30ne of his most; bitter articles against the Jesuits is
"AI margen del libro 'A • .M.D.G." ObI"8.s Completaa, I (Madrid, 1953)

532-535.

7
pression on him.

He says, "There is a lIght haired German, med-

itative and sentimental, WQo breathes in the twilight ot my

soul. tt 14

He took courses in tre universities ot Leipzig, Berlin,

and Marburg.

Among his teachers he

Cohen, his master, and Diltbey.

wa~

especially intluenced by

-

FUrthermore, there was bis Bre.

tano, his lJietzsche, his Rickert, Buckle, Gobineau, Spengler,

and such historians as Renan, Momsen, Ranke, and Hostovett.1 5
The identification wi t}] Germany in the early years of his

career was blended with the influenoe of Bergson, Michelet,

Descartes, Marianne, and many o't.t'1er ph1.losophers.
He returned to Spain with the mission to Europeanize it.

He

--

edited the periodical El Faro, in Which he dedicated himselt to
the dl.ftus"on.
of the doctrines of t he Great European socio10., -;-;
~

gist. and

ph~10sopher8.

In 1910 at the age of

27,

Ortega took

-!:;he chair of' Metaphysics at the Universldad Central de Madri,d.

On March

2"

1914,

l~

made his gradlose appearance in the pub-

lic lite of Spain ..'11th a speech in the

~j;t:no ~

.!!.

Comedia

~

Madrid •

ll~otras C~letas de Ortesa I Gaseet (Madrid. 1936), p.

cited in Jose

~chez

VI!lasenor, Jose Ortega

1943), p. 1~.
15 T1me" October, 31 (1955), p. 22.

Z

44,

Gasset (Mexico.

8
In his flJeech, "Vieja 1. nueva poli tica, he denounced the evils
of the monarchy, the reg.nor' an d the restON tion, and he present-

ed the program of the Liga ~ educacion Eolitica espanala. 16 .A.
an official organ of his teague of Political Education,a daily

paper called Espana. was published .by him wi th A. Nessi and
BaroJa.

His main purpose was to create a new intellectual at-

mosphere and to stimulate the great 'vvriters of the time.

1917, he pl.lblishe d
in Al"gent ina.

In

--

the review, El sol, with Niool and Urgoi ti

lie returned to Madrid and organized the famous

Time called it tithe most widely quoted
Spanish revlew. n17 He took a.n active part in the ove::-throw of

Revista de occidente.

tM monarchy through the Association para
2ubliOa..

1931,

servicio en

.!! !!.:.

"Spaniards," he said at this time,H our country does

not exi~t, rebuild it.

In

.!!

The monarchy must destroy itself. nlS

he was elected deputy to Cong;ress.

"The magnificent mo-

ment has arrived wben fate has imposed upon the Spaniards the
:right£'; to act gl"sndlosely." said ortega saluting the new Republlc}9

160bras Complete.s, Ortega y Gasset, Jose, I (Madrid,

265... 308.

17T1me

.

(January

17. 1949), p. 45.

18..r1me (October 31. 1955), p.

-

24.

1953),

9
With the onset of the oivil war in 1900, he fled to Franee
lIead and sour. u20

Ooncerning his 1"01$ in the civil war, Iriarte

"Let us not make one who was present in the revolution, its

saya:
author.

There has been exaggeration in this Despec.t. n2l

Franco wanted to nominat e hlm the offie ial philosopher of his
movement a.t; the end of the waf:" providing he would change certain
line s of his thought.

Ortega fIa tly

refused~

as migllt be expect.

ed and in so doing condenmed himself to be a voluntary exile of
twelve years in France and Sou.th t\l'Mrica.
in

His return to Spa.:i.n

1949, was noted in the preas of the world over.

great

p1.

!lIn times ot

ssion the duty of the intellectual is to remain qulet, for

in times of great passion one must lie, and the intellectual does
not have the right to speak 1.U1truth.,,22

He retired from. all ac-

tivity that could associa.te him with the govemm.nt.

Tha.t same

year (1949), he attended a oongress on the centenary ot' Goethe
and presented a paper in Aspen; • Colorado.

Much could be sal d

about this event and his a.ttitude towards the English-speaking

oountries, but his seclusion and his ideas with respect to fu"'l1eri-

-----

20Tilll8 (October

31, 1955), p.
,

2,.

2l Ir iarte. "Ortega en au vivir y pensar," RaZOD I. Fe
also ot. Jose Sa.nohez Villasenor, Jose or~eii'
(Mexico, 194;), pp. 11... 21; and Julian Marias, 151lIIosophes
~oies de notre tem}.! (paris, 1954), pp. 65-76; and Penuel
r ega-Y su f110so la (Madrid, 1960), pp. 1;-22.

pp.344-;57;

(1956),
y Oasset
e!pan-

Grana1l,

220n this point, see Iriarte's artiole "ortega f 1a dimension
ang1osajona de au ptmsamiento,tt Raz0I;' l. !!. (1949), p. 344.

10
can demooracy prevented him from reviving a universal. acc1runation.

-

-Ortega died of cancer on October 19. 1955, in Macrid.

The Revolt of the Masses was a best seller in the United states.

Ac-

cording to his wife he died. a Christian death. 2 3 CUrtius praised

him highly and gave him the priority of thought which it was supposed would go to

Helde~8er

rival of Heidegger.

-

2~1me (October

24Iriarte.

or Jaspers.

Niedemayer called him a

24

31, 1955), p.

22.

'

f! ~ mental ~

Ortega (Madrid, 1949), p. 33.

CHAPTER I

ORrEGA yctASSET: THE SOCIOLOGIST

!!:!.

approaoh

2!.

Jullan Marlas fCJd

th~

I?resent.!2.!:!.

The philoso-

phlcal thought of Ortega., Gasset has been syatematlz.d by Julian
Marias.

)(arlas had one main purpOSu in pel'.form1ng this _""loe

tor philosophersJ to reorgani,e the various essays of ortega around salient Id.as and pl-oblems rather than around the origlnal
but dlsoonne cted topios wh1,ch insplred them.
s~llar

The wrlter has a

purpose in the SJstematlzat10n ot Ortega'8 soc1010gy.

namely. to pre.ent his ideas In terms familiar to sociologlst8,
and to reorientate his works around problems of sociologlcal
signiflcanoe.
Or tela c.!!Lb.!....conatd.l'ed a.!.,.sooiolo§lat.

Ortega's extensive treat-

ment of sooial realitl•• covers their cultural and Ideologloal
aspeots as well as their politlcal implicatlon..

As we will .e.

his studle. are often In agr.ement with the Ideas ot oontempora1"3'
sociologlst IJ but at times, he disagrees emphatlcall,..

Hi8 mon

P1ean1ngtul sooiologloal works have dealt with the nature of 8001al
~aots and wi'lh tile origin ot the power element in sooiety.1

Prom

nis idea. on the.e two elemants ot sooi.ty he .formed a g.neral

INi<bolas
PP. q7-99.

s.

Timasheff, Soc1010g10al ~!'l (.ew Yolk, 1957)

11
theal. similar to Paretots oirculation at the elites. 2

The strug-

gle between majori*" am minori ty grOUPI, which is a l,-nthe.ls
of Toennittl and Pareto, determines all soclal changes, and constitute. a general theory aimilar to the 'WOrka of Sorokln,Marx, ,
an~

DanllevlIJq.
~le

it is true that Ortega f • literary expre.lion 1a lome-

what ambiguous, the, thought conveyed by it is unified.

Usill8 aa

a starting point hi. general theory of the 800io1087 of knowledge

about the s oclal. implication of ideologies, he talcl•• D1S.D'1 of the
q~estions

that occupy the mind of

80C

iologists today.

ae

appll••

his tlle aries to :such problema as waa, progress and decadence" and
:tnternationa1iara.

He 81ao gives a prominent place to methodolog-

ical disou •• iona,-as for example, in the situation and value

or

the moral solenc•• , a term borrowed from Weger whO" work. Ortega
partially translated into Spanish.'
In one of his las t essays,

!! hOllb~ I !! sent,e,

the whole problem of *>oia1 facts and their realit,..

he treat.
In this

work, he infcrma us W the moving ooncem that inspired him, in
hi. earl,. ,.ear., to read the works of the f !rst sociologist 11. 3 Be
tells us the great wonder tbat was stlrred in him by the fact that
no one had devoted muoh time to formulating an aoourate dfd'1n1t1on
of s octety.

2Ibld.,

O:rtega un dertake s the task hlmsel..f an d flnal1,. arp_

163.

30rtega, Man sin~.reO;li4 Tatlslated from ,Spanish into Engllsh
by Wlllard R. 1ra
a • 1957), pp. 178-179.

.w

12
rIves at his own definition.

In general, historicism, the oulturo-soclal approach to
society and the doctrine of the point

~!!!!,

are the main ideas

whioh stimulated Ortega to stress the immediate empirioal aspe"t

of socialfacta. 4
~eroble~ ~

systematization. One of the first difficulties en-

countered with the sociologioal thought· of Ortega y Gasset, and,
therefore,the main prOblem of this thesis, is the laok of systematizatiop.

Lest one fall into a rather mean!ngless disoussion

of generalities. one must have clear ideas about what constitute.
sociology.

Does one mean by sociology a systematio approach to

social facts that involves methodological tools and empirical
verification?

The. t the works of most

sociolo~ists

are orderly
,

and methodical and. aimed at a definite scientifIc purpose cannot
be tioubted. yet ir one were tQrestrict the notion of socioloQ

to the ststematic treatment of societ,y, one should be unneces8arl
11' limiting the soope or the science.

On the othor hand, a pure :".

nominal definition of sociology would be equally inadequate.

For

it would not help tne discussion to say that 800io181' is whatever

1& oontained 1n books bearing such a tltle.5

.

.

But there 1s a prior question to be asked wijh

T.~gard

this point: just how explicit .should be the syste'=latio

to

treatm.n~

4:rurtey, The Soope and Method of sociol.oll (New York. 1953).
p. 19
-- -5IbId., p. 303.

1,
and methodology of an author'
ed

thel~

Comte,

Durkhe~,

and weber dress-

thought In a style that more closely resembles phlloso-

phy than any ot the natural scienoes.

Wlthin the realm ot phl1-

osophy, the novels and plays of people 11ke sartre and Camus are
aooepted by philosophers as oontributions to their field.

But

in the field of the natural Bciences no work is aooepted unless
it is systematlzed and contains a method.

The soientifio orit

eria tor sociology should be as independent ot the or1terl't tor
philosophy as it should be independent trom the criterla tor
natural sclenoe, Ortega at times otfers

m.~hodologloal

verlty his state'Dlents, but he is totally unsystematic.
preters not to call an unorganized

t~eatment

tool. to
It one

ot sooiety a soclo-

logy, still this does not mean that a SOCiology oannot be written
by those

who

systematize Ortega.

On

the other hand, ortega did

not write novels or plays, but essays-.the literary genre which
most partloipates In the style of 80cl010gioal writers.

In con-

clusion, it does not make a great difterence whether one want.
to conslder ortega a strict 800iologist or not, it one cannot
deny the taot

tha~ooiologloal

oontent oan be extraoted trom

hi. writing ••
~

problem

~

Grand The0!7' The second dlffloulty somewhat oon-

nected with the former ls the problem of a
logy or grand theorr ot ortega t • work.
generalizations.

weltansohau~

sooio-

Ortega makes sweeping

He deduces hi, sociological conclusions tram

compar1.on. ot various cultures difterent in space and time.
From the downfall ot the Roman Empire_ for instance, he hal
derived metasociological considerations that he applies to our
age.

Parallel are dra-.:1 between such different countries as Rome

and England; Germany and Greeoe.

The princIple. of democrao,. are

traced to the middle as•• , and the dIvision ot nationalities are
establiShed even betore this time.

HOw can we give a solution to the long quarrel oentered around the 80 oalled Fand theo!?, when we have such great nam••

8.

Par.onl and Merton, SOrokln and Kills on diftennt sid•• ot the
battle'

It i. _11 to notioe that parsons .ee. the nee_d of a

wide soc1010gioal theorr 1n the .ame arguments that hi. adversar,.,
Merton, u.e. again.t him.
"one of Merton'. consistent emphase. with reterenoe to theorie. ot the middle range bas been on codification.

Codification,

however--neces.aril,., as he make. clear-.involves reterence to
level. of ge.erallt,. hIgher than the level repre.ented in the parti cular Items ot theory being Qodlr!ed.

It doe. con at ! tute om ot

the most important type. pt link between lower and higher levels
Of generalization in theorye"6
This insoluble diohotQmJ bet.een grand theor,. and theories

Of the m1ddle range il more olearly seen

in Merton'. treatment

5Taloott Parson., -General TheoP,y in 80010187," SOCi010~
Tedaz, ed. by Merton, Broom and Oottrell (New York, 1959) p. 9-~

15
of the 8ooiologz

~

knowledge of Mannhetm. In his IdeoloSl

~

Utopia, the latter attempted to end permanent17 the friction between European and American 80ciolo17 with a long defense of the
sociology

~

totalitl (weltansohauuna), more oultivated in Europe.

"The mass of fact. and points of vi.. w is tar greater than can be
accomodated by the present state ot our theoretical apparatua and
systematizing capaoity."7

'Ibis p81'agraph, written at the begin-

ning of the nineteenth century is a direot ans.er to the
writings ot Merton.

c~rent

Mil18 defends a t7Pe of theor,y similar to

that of Merton on the base,S that it is oeces.&1"7 in order to lolve
the soolal problems of our t1mea. 8 Mannheim u.e. the same argument in defen.e ot the opposite position.

"Like.ise it is pO.8i-

ble to explain, on the basis of this ditterence, the type ot
thought involved In the American formulation of the problem. as
represented by the followinga How oan % do thi.,
this concrete

~i1dlvldual

problem?

How can I solve

And in all these questions ..

sense th$ optimistIc undertone: I need not worry about the whole,
the whole will take oare ot Itself."9 VIlo? Mannheim has also dealt
with the shortoomings of a

matter-~-tactne88

in sooiology. baae.

on the atud7,ot concrete data without a general theory.

He even

goes to the extent ot sayIng that those studies which abandon
,

""

"~"

>'

•

'~"'!...,,",

• p

7Mannhet., Ideology ~ utopia (New York, 1960), p. 252.

8~. "'YrI~ht Mills,. !S!. SOciological lmaaination (Ne. York,
48:

1·9:-'9), p.

9iannhe1m, p.

255.

16
the whole and limit themselves to immediate problema
any soientifio va1ue. 10
Merton's

orltlol~

of Mannhetm is the following, "Mannhe

analysis is limited, as well, by his failure to specify the

_t~_

-

or mode of relations between locial struoture and know1edge. 1I
Doe. that lIlean that Merton wants a sooiol'gy of
lated in term. of middle range?

He is not too exp1ioit on th

point, but it would seem utterly oontrar,y to the trend of a s
1087 of knowledge the rejection of grand the0!l.
The conolusion

w.

could torm from such a puzzle

would reflect little more than personal preference.t

-

how transcend the whole d1scussion and search for a solution
another level.

There 1s one point on wh10h both s1 ••• agree,

d

that 11 the problem of prespective or .eltansohauungl the gen
theme of the sooiology of lmO~dge.

Merton agree. wi th Man

on the fact that so01010gy as a~olenoe is modified by the e x if,

enttal situation of, a determinate ou1ture.
of the tendenoy to introduce further concreteness into formal
of sooiological problems, it (100101017) sets itself up .s tb
only

socioloQI~lt"ls

,unoonsciously guided by motIves similar

10Ibld. p. 102: n~pirioal research which limIts it.elt
part10u1ar sphere is tor a long time in the same position as
mon s.n... "
IlMerton, Social Theory and Social structure {Glencoe, 1

p.

498.

0

a
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those .midb prevented its historical forerunner, the burgeois
liberal mode of thought, fro. ever getting beyond and abstract
and generalizing mode of observation
Mannheim.

in its theory,n12

says

In other words there is a point that has been left

out of the whole discussion, namely the personal

mo~ives

that

compelled Merton to favor the middle range theory and the facility with which this theory has been accepted in some cul,tural
miliewe.

It .... analyze these motiye. and their group-determUl-

anta--an area formerly thought to lie outside the domain of socio
logy--we would probably discover that the main difference between
the two great SOCiologists lies in their cultural background, for
one culture is prone to the concrete and Teritiable, and th. othe
to prospective and vision.

Most probably, both are incomplete

with regard to scientific systematizatioB.

-The

cultural milieu of Ortega must enter into consideration. From

-

-

what has been said need to approach a sociologist from the
viewpoint of his own background and culture ia obvious.

In the

introduction we already said somethiAS about Ortega's own background.

About the culture in which he lived, namely the Spanish

culture, Moore and Gurvitch say that it is characterized by an
uncritical tendency to theorize and set norms of behavior. 13 The

12 Ibid., p. 278.
l3Twentieth century SOCiology (New York,

1945), p. 653.
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last point: the normatlve character is due not only to the moralist temper or the Spaniards, but mainly to the urgency ot soclal
solutions for a ntmlber of social problems.

As

Moore and Gurvltoh

point out, most of the Spanith sociologists have been exclusively
preoccupied with the cuestion obrera.14Even to the present day,
sPanish sociologists have spent more of their time and efrort in
associations for working men.

Spanish sociolEY has been nourished

by socialism, on the one hand, and the social teachings of the
Ohuroh, on the other.
Regarding the normative aspect, we should say from the outset. that Ortega was not very influenced by It.

It is true that

he manlfeeted a strong tendency for action, but he conceived of
science as divoreed l~om the quostion or value. 1 5

On the other hand, we do find in Ortega the second point,
that Is, the tendency to theorize.

tt

ortega has brought to the

study of society and ot its structure the keen perseption of his
up-to-date philosophical ta.lent, evaluating the functional char-

acter of the tmass t and of the individual in his possibilities

ot action and orientation to it. n16
~

problem

~

methodo1o$l. There is one more question that must

14Ibid.
150rtege.. "Introduecion a una estimativa,1I
VI (Madrid. 1955), 315-336.
, ' , ',",

l60UrvitCb and Moore, ,.657.

~,

Obras Completas,
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be touched upon more specifically in our quest for a precise definition of a socidogist.

This question is method.

There is no

sociologist or any scientist, for that matter, without a methodology.

Ortega deals with cultures and other social phenomena--

sound method?

most espe oiallY' with the mass phenomena of today.
his theories in

a

If by method

we

istics and indices, the answer is obviously, no.
bave a lllstorico-oultural method tha.t

able for a sociology ot knowledge.

~A'annh.im

D:>es he ground
understand statBut he does

believe s inoispen..

Ortega has writtea a great

numbe:, of pages on historioism and the historical method.
heim se.ya about this methodology of history:
neither a

me~e

?,fann-

"Historicism:I.s

fad nor a fashion; it is not even an intellectual

ourrent, but the vel"Y basis on which we construct our observations of the sooio-cultural reality."l7 Few writers in the field
of sociology to day show as profound a grasp of historical facts
and theories as Ortega y Gasset, or indicated before when we were
talking about his souroes.
'Vi thin the his torioal method, Ortega makes great use of the
oomfB rison and comparative systems of ;~reber.18 His essays about
races and cultures are formulated and discovered with the help
of Weber's methodologiat: tool: the ideal-typo.l9 The main dlf17Mannheim, Essays on the SOC1010~ ot Culture, od. by Ernest
Mannheim and paul leosrlemetnLondon,
5'91, p. 1Ji.
18see . . an e~l. IISobre Ie. muerte de Roma," Obras Completae, II (Madrid, 1954), 537-547.
190rtega
lion d. las masas p. ~6.
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ferenoe between him and

~ber.

however, is that the former never

discusses explicitly his methodology.
Ortega1s method, for the most part. is historical, as we
said. He has been called a

~-historian

and a philosopher

££

cultur,~. and not with eny intended oompliment. 20 He is often

enough oritlsized for not isolating historical faots, and for his
tnterest in similarities throughout history, rather than in facts
Ttmasheff describes the difference between historians
logists in this way z

and

socio-

ITThe histcrian shows the variable; the soci

logist emphasizes the constant !l1ld recurring. n21 The keynote in
ortega's theory of history is the ftoti(,tl of generation; an idea
that bas oocupied also the mind of Mannhelm and other sociologist
of hlstory.22

The basi. discoveries in the field of historic41

socIology are used by ortega on the 'fields of political 80ciology
and sooiology of' Jmowledge.

About the hlstortcal approach, Janse

says: "With this recognition of the importance of theory as .uch.
there 1s growing up a corresponding apprecia+;:ton

of-t~w

neoessity

of the historical approach tor a proper understanding of ourr$nt
20

Joaquin Iriarte, "Ortega en su vivir y pensau,"

(1956). p.

428.

21'lima sheff , p.

HI!! '1.

6.

22ESsays on the Sociology or K:nowledge(tondon, 1959). p.

276-320.

Fe

-
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theoreti ••l ~roblema and issue •• n2 3 And Mills, who hopes
science that can solve many of today'. problem., observe.
necessity orthe historical point or vie. in

so.~oS7:

"Men no •

days otten reel that they cannot solve the trouble. they are
against, so long as they remain within their

p~vate

situatio

••

limited by the boundaries of their everyday worlds, most peop
never transcend the close-up horizons ot their job and .famIly
and

neighborhood~

•• And the more award they beoome ot ideals a
,

threats, ambitions and promia.s. which do not tItanscend the.e
immediate l60ale., the more trapped they come to teel."24
The need

or

a theory

or

action and ot an orientation *hat

taoes the present political, economic and social decisioDS ot
our times, cannot be removed by partial sociological studies.

With such reports, tentative and di.oonnected, one does not ha e
adequate data tor the formulation ot .olid synthesia
serve as an orientation tor action.

The need to act is press

and, if .e want to assure our future, we must act rationally.
This is the point that is continually reiterated by those who
detend a weltanschauung sociology.

We could also bring in her

23J1oward E. Jen.en, "Developments in Analysis 0::: ;':l.)cial
Thought," in Backer and Boskott's Modern SOciological Theorz
(B•• York, 1957), p. 41.

~111., "The Promise of

in 1960.

the SOoial Soi.noes," Paper give

•

22

--

all the arguments of Sorokin t • Fads and Foibles 1n Modern Sociol-

-

ogy against the modern tendenceto atomize social problems and to
forget about the whole. 25 This work contains one of the major
statements for a historioo-sooial approach to sooiolo81.

-main purpose in
ortega's

~

loal.

300101061!!! practical science. Ortega'.

all hi s historical studie. was to give to the

Spaniards of hi s time solId material upon which they could .rom
adequate ideas of' their problems and the way to solve th$m.
fut~e

The

was the great question that Ortega saw hovering over spain

and the rest of Europe.

His attempt to answer that question mer-

1 ted for him the epl taph of' social pr?phet. "If' there is anything

that characterizes my life, it is that I have had to struggle
with the worldt s dramatic futUl'e, the f1.1bure always tending to

.~. tho ground of the present on whicb

I

had my t •• t. n26

25!!!! and Foibles ~ Moder;p SOcl0101l. fChieago, 1956),
sorokin,

pltr~.

Chicago U. Press.

26Time (Januar;y, 1949), p. 46.

CHAPTER II
GENERAL SOCIOLOGY OF ORTEGA
the

~

socl010g1ca1

!2!! ~

Ortega. ODe ot the tavorite theme.

of Ortegats eS8ay. is the polltical px-oblem.

Around It, Ortega

builds up a socl010gical theory as a meta-polltloal toundatlon.
The publlcation ot this theory had been promised tor many years.
The work,

entl~l.d·

!!2 ~ people.

was edlted wlth allght tln-

ishlng touche., atter the author's death.

!! hombre Z !! 6ente

Is, among the tew systematic works ot Ortega, the best organized.
It centaina his main

p~opo.ition8

about soclal taots, as.oclatlon,

soclal organIzatlon, soolal ohange, and normatlve aotlon.
The tltle ot thls chapter tlts the parallel that Ortega .stabllshe. betw.en sool01081 and cultural

ant~.pology.

The point

of departure tor these two flelds Is the same, becaus., as

w.

will s.e immedlately, the sooial tacta are primarily normative.
and norms are identifled wlth oulture.
soc1010gy !! ! !!!!-polltical foundatlon.

~ ~

people opens

wlth a long preamble whioh 1. an almost verbatim. transcriptlon of
hls early eS8ay: "Ensimiamamiento y alteraclon." In thls introduction, Ortega stresses the imperiou. need that our age ha' to
know .oc1010gy In order to solve the problems of an ever ehanglng
IMan and pe2P1e, Translated from the Spanish by: Willard R.
6y: I.W.Norton and Co. (Ne. York, 1957).

Trask,-an~.

social order.

More spe cifically.

he would say, we need to have

clear and definite ideas about the essenoe of society and of the
social facts:
My subject is this: Today people constantly talk otlaws

and law, the state, the nation and internationalism, public
opinion and Pllblic power, good policy and bad, pacifism and
jingoi8Dl, "DlJ oountl'7"' and humanity, social justice and
sooial injustice, collectivism and capitalism, socialization
and liberali_, a nd individual and the collectivity, md so
on and so on. .And they not only talk, in the press, at
their clubs,c.,.., and taverns, they a180 argue. And they
not. only argue; they also fight for the things that these
wor~. designate. And once started fighting, they kill each
other--by hundred., by thousands, by millions."Z
It we asked the peale who argue about political Ideas in the
streets and cates,

what do they mean by the state, the law, the

national, etc., we would disoover their total ignoranoe.

They

do not know anything about the phe:nomena represented by political
terms.

on

the other hand, law, capitalism, colleotlvism, etc.,

are nothtng more than Idealizations ot soola1 realities.

They

are abstractions that we have learned from the society we live
in, about this society.

"It this idea is not clear," ..namely the

idea of society--" "all these words do no mean what they pretend
to and are mere empty show."'
way, 1 s the goal.

or

To derine what society is in a new

the whole work.

2ortega, !!a~ people (New York, 1957), p. 11.

-

'Ibid.,p. 12.
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Wature

~

80cial facts

~

soclet:.

Ortega tells Us about his

search for a definition of SOCiety in the works of the sociologists:

Tf.tl.l the sooiologists have lett us umC" sfied, even in re-

spect to the fundamental notions of th61r soclalogles--for the
8imple reson that they never took the trOUble to oome really to
grip with the most elemlJnta17

phenom~na

out of which the social

reality arises. n 4
Ohoosing anthropology as a point of departure, the author
invites us to place ourselves in front of an apets oage.

The be·

hav10. of this animal--the hearest of all to mane-surprises us
beoause of its tatal absorption 1ntoits physical environment.

The

ap~

lives a purely extroverted lite; it react. immediately to

the objects and alterations induoed into its field of peroeption.
The savage liv$s also as though imprisoned in a world ot threats
and obstaoles.

Around them he direots exolusively his attention.

But there is a great differenoe between to. savage and the apeJ
namely that sometimes the former strives to disentangle himself
.tram the difficulties aroWld him and he reflects and ignore. to
his enviro:rnment.

When we put ourselves in place of the ape in

the cage, we tend to think that it would be extenuating to have
to answer to any new stimulus, and to live so absorbed in things

40rtega, ~ ~ Pegple

(New

York. 1957), p. 119.

r·
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outside us.

Nhen the ape does not have anything to react to,

he falls asleep.

Man, on the exntrary. has an inwardness where

he can hide, and,

80

to speak, bend himself to.

This inwardness

is an lntus, and from this work, Ortega deduees the category
}erioritl.

!a-

This is the first observable human behavior and has

a vital importance for social behavior.

From the depths flows

meaning and purpose. 5 All the other difference. between human
and animal behavior are minimal compared to this. However, we do
not intend to skip over a great nmnber of similarities between
the two.·
need.

"bat leads man to recollect· himself is his biological

B_tween the biological drives and their fulfilment, re-

flection end its derivate, sulture, set In.

Thought and aotion,

therefore, appear intimately connected in primitive mana
cordingly, it 1s impossible to speak of action except in
as it will be governed by a previous

c~e.~lationJ

"AC_
80

tar

and vice

versa, contemplation,or being within onels selt, is nothing but
a projecting of future aotion. n6

w.

man even add this further consideration: within this bio-

logical oontext, thought is merely functional and its role is to
organize our behavior in order to survives "This i8 80mething ot

5Ort• ga , ~ ~ People pp. 16-17_

-

6Ib1d ., p. 23,

I"""
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.bat I wanted to suggest in the epigram ••• that .e do not live in
order to think but . . think in order to sucoeed in subsisting or
surviving."7 Notioe that we are talking here about a plan, an orientation for aotion.
with culture?

How ean Ortega, then, identlfy this plan

The individual plan oannot become oulture until

it beoome. sooialized.

This 8ocia.lization oonsists, firat, in

the imposition of something private through a long prooess of
transformations.

Finally this praotice beoomes aooepted as a

-

use or costume of the tribe. the region., the country.

Ibat Is,

therefore the main differanee between the individual and social

aotion or culture, for Ortega?
Thoae human actions that we put on account of an impersonal
and indeterminate subjeot whioh is the tall' and 'nobody'
whiCh we may call, people, collectivity, .ociety, are p~er1'1 called social facts. Such facts are irreducible to the
lite of the individual. They a.ppear in the realm of human
interaotion, but are not mere facts of simple interaction.
That which we thing or say because it is sat4, that
which we do, because it 1s done, is uaual1y oalled usage. nS
Social

!22

individaAl aotion.

Refleotion or ensimismamiento,

Ortega oa11s it, is the human act

~ar

excellenoe.

is usage, whioh is the individual aot sooialIzed.
er, we must aomehow deduce the latter.
first oharaoteristic of

8Ortega,

t~is

!! homb:re ll!!

'8.S

Its correlatIve

From the form-

Ortega holds that the

transmission from the individual to

gents, p. 25.
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the &001&1 is that

or

.2!.-personalization.

The idea, plan or

sk1ll·that is born in the individual today, in a oonsoiou.ta8hio
tomorrow will be a social stereotype.

wnat was responoible in it

origin becomes impersonal and meaningless sooial behavior, something tbat we all do because everybody else does it.

So that

social and indlv1daal aetlon are mutually exclusive.

This 1s,

ot COUl'se a sobematic""''W,l,.Qcr::Looking at the sooial taots.

Ortega:

attention 1s direoted toward the oharaoteristio. at individual
and sooial act!cl1,

50

that be is dealing with abstraotions.

reality, however, these two aspeots are going to btl ml.ud.

suan

as

individual and social action are irreduoible.

character1stio of sooial action is its lack of meaning.
sqa.

In

But

Another
Ortega

"That is human, which I do, because it has a meal ing for

me and which I understand.,,9 When 'individual aotion becomes .001a
lzed, it loses the or-iginnl meaning that cI'eated it, and keeps
only its purpose.

The purpose of sooial action is normative

~nd

performs a great servioe, eo tar as social integration is concerned.

or

In order to ver-i.fy this whole the si IS about the irreducibility

BOcial into individual aotion, Ortega gives a detalled descrip-

tion of the origln ot social acts.
~

third level

~

human action: the inteEPersonal. There is one

element that medlates individual ana soclal behavior: interper-

r

sonal act10n.

of SOCiety.

Human existenoe has as m,ch need or objects as
From a biologioal viewpOint, the environment 1s

so connected. with. human behavior tr.w.t the external stimulus,

or c1rcumstances, as Ortega calls it, is an integral part of
human organisma "The environment is not-something external to

tbe organism, but rather an orga11 of life, the organ of excitation. n·10
lb1·!U&\W~'·~e:· ~bam!ID'la~

,.a ...'.lelo,l_l

_'-I..i • •,
tion.

.-ial.

·W...• ., W

From

21 lattneVoll&l

flU. Act. . .

_.l~

aotion.
1._. at the Ixt.mal

al __,..,~ ••i,. Of oon'.mpla.

tbe tree that blocks our path to the tood we eat,

things are the obstacles or helps with wnich we have to deal in
order to·survive.

In their first relation to us, external things

are presented as faoilities or disadvantages that expand or contract the possibilities ot our lite.

This ia the primordial as-

peot of things outside U8,
The world ot oiroumstance, we said, 1s thus an immense pragmatic or pract1cal rea11ty--not a rea11ty made up ot things.
-Things- in present-day parlanoe means anything that has 1 ts
be1ng by and in itselt, hence that 1s independent ot u ••
But the component. of the vital world are only those that
are for and in m1 life--not for themselv•• and 1n thea.elv.8.
They are only as tac11itie. and diffioulties, advantages and
disadvantages whereby the I that each one ot us 1. can suoceed 1n being. They are, then, 1n etfect! Incruments, utensils, cbattels, mean. that serve me ••• 1

lOortega, "Ep1togo al libro tDe France.ca. BeatrIce," Obraa
CompleBia, III (Madr1d, 1955), 325.
llortega, ~~ ,.op~e, p. S2.

Things are ordered according to a pragma tical hirarchr,
one to another, their final organization ending in the satisfaction of 80me needs of mine.

I

eee them in terms of a person-

al goal,12 In order for this hierarohy to be useful, ~hin~s have
to be determinable and predictable.- Things have a definite PI'&!matieal value once I know them, because loan predict beforehand
the reaction of my organism with regard to them: "An adult human
being' 8 every action toward or upon w mething olJviously take.
into account his earlier experienoes in oonnection with that
something, so that his action starts from the qus.lltiesthat. aocording to his knowledge, the things possesses.
he knows that that stone is very

l~rd

In our example,

but not as hard as steel;

and if what he wants to do, fQ)r some purpose of his own, is to
break it to pieeee, he knows tba t he can do so by merely hl tting
it wi th

til.

hammer." 13 But the other presents himself to.tre in

a diametrically opposed fashion.

Let

UB

see the way Ortega de-

picts this appearance of the other man:
Now indeed, in the area that my horizon encloses, appears
the Other. The 'Other' is the other man. As a sensible
presence, all that I have of him is a body, a body that
d1spla1. its peculiar form, that move., that manipulates
things in my sight, that in other words exhibits external or
vis1ble 'behavio~. to use the term of the Amemican psychologists. But the suprising th1ng, the strange and finally
m1sterious thing, i8 that, though there are present to U8

IIr

120rtega~ . "El tema de :nuestro iiiempo," Obras Cosp1eta..,
(~adrid, 1955), 182 •••
;130~tGga; !!!! ~ people, p. 85.

onl, a t1gure and lOme bod117 movements, 1n or through
this presenoe we see sornoth1ng that 1s essentially inv1s1ble, a;)methlng tba t 18 pure inwardne8s, lIOaetfins
that eaoh of us knows direotly only of himself •••
We are 1n the field of social psyohology. to which

~

fact2, Ortega reduces all his soc1010g1cal investigations of
this 6ssay.

What we discover first, or rather, glimpse in the

other man is an inwardness like our own.
has 'been unified.
had its own plaoe

So far the universe

Now it 'becOUlt98 dispersed.
ill

Before, everything

ml universe in relation to me.

and "there" begins to be relative.

There are other people and

therefore there are other puints of reference.

my place, but

wha~ever

Now my "here"

"I can change

place it may be, it w1l1 be my

ther~'

Apparently 'here' and tIt and there l are inseparable for 11fe.
And s1nce the world, with all the things in it, must b,tor!.!
from here. it automatically beoomes a prespectlve--that Is, its
thing. are near to or far from
above or below here.
When other people

tip

h!!:.!,

to right or left of the,r!,.

This 1s the structural

~w

of man's world,

pear into the soene of life: ·''.£he Other MaD

also has his here--but thls'here f of the Other 1s not mine. 1t16
Another gre&. t dirfa rence between the thing and the ,Qther
Man consists 1n the fact of z'eciproo1ty.

"Hence, in our rela-

tion with the stone, our action has only one direotion, it runs

14Ib1d ., p. 91-92.

-

lSIb1d., p. 74
16Ibid." p. 75.
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from us to the atone, and there s1mply ends. 1t17

trIn distinc·

tlon from the s ton~ and the plant, the animal, fI __ or, 1n o'llr case
man--appears to .e: &8 S)meth1ng tba t responds to me and 1n this

sense assomethlng
that does not simply ex1 st tor me but that,
.
!
since I also

/

for it, co-exists wi-th me.

exis.~

but does not co_e~lst."18
interpreted.
body else.
Now

b~pome,

I

The stone exists

Man becomes interpreter as well as

tor the first time, an object of some-

- \
ThincJS\were
blind and could not see my inwardness.

"

eye. are 100ki~ at me and sanebody answers me in an unpl"e-

dictabl~

manner.

\

WIth regard to our relation with animals and-

people, ortega 8ay.: "However our total relation with the ani-.
mal is at the time lim! ted and eontused.

'fhi s suggests to us

a very natural methodolog1oal reservation--tbat we should look
for other taota in wblch the reeiprooity would be clearer, unlimited and evIdent, tha t 1s, in which the other being that respond. to me should in prinolple be-capable of responding to me
as muoh as I respond to it._19 Evidently this 1s the case of
a man-to-man relation.

Reciproe1ty, as Ortega calls that re-

lation, is an Immediate nudIty of man betore man that constitutes the interper.onal phenomenon.

l7rb1d

-=,p.

85.

18rb1d ., p. 87.
19rb1d., p. 103.

The interpersonal

wo~ld

~~

It

is the world of affective and indormal meetings; the world of
friendshlp and kindahip.
Differenc~

between

~

i?terpersoal

~~

social level. Usages

When the Other Man has not entered this realm of interpersonal relations, I do notas yet have either a social Oran
lnterindividual bond with him.
enemy or a friend.

The OtberMan Can turn out an

Therefore, when we meet, we have to break

the barrier between both of us, at the same time.
we~Jstart

Therefore,

out with the odd gesture of holding and shaking each.

other's hand.

This sooially patterned gesture, meaningless to

both 'of us lathe social action par excellence.

We do not know

anything about the origin and primitive meaning of the handshake.
We do it just to oQnform.

On the other hand this gesture has

the roarvelous effect of symbolically placing both of us under a
common shelter, the law, the mores, the uaages.
bands we .eem to tell each other

tr~t

In shaking

it is our wish to submit

bo some general code of la.ws stipulated by a society.

But we

implicitly symbolize those things without explicitly revealing
ourselves, because the handshake is an impersonal act.
means to manipulate a "stranger".
"only a relative and indirect
!,s" .PO~S.,;~~l~~.,.

,)3:H,~",,__ firgt

a~d

It is t h

"Between us," says ortega,
always dubious

co~aunication

and last, that is, a t the beginning
~'

and at the end of my experience in

.~

respec~~':,the

for me he is fundamentally the Being

·other Man,

wh/l~~
ett'tftlgN ''\;0
\
l..JNiVFrt'::..:'il: ,

~

Lli

v:

. :;'"

me, the

r·
I

/

Ij

"

"

the essentia):' Cst rang_:r.· 20 The note of torelgnnesl, permeates
/

t

.

all social/ reall~t7: ntn a man's body whicb, as suoh, belongs
,

to my WOrld, ~.

ba". tbe intima t10n and the deolara tion of a

I,

f'

I

being--the other-.,.and! a World--his world--which are absolutely
alien, absolute11 foreign to me, strange to me and to everything
that i8

Ddne .n21,: Ortega
!

the .orld ot t~e hot-I,
.

oalls this world ot social relations

,I

80

I

that in 1t I am leading a pseudo-11fe •

Our normal,' life consists ln our ocoupy1ng ourselves with
pregma ta,' wf!th things or concerns and importances tha. t
are not properly sucb but are new irrespons1ble interpretations put !f.orth by others or by ourselves; If_tba t is to
. 8a,., the U~g.8. ttl mean tta t since our life consists in
always do1,ng, something with or about these pseudo-things,
it 'would .inetltabl,. be a pseudo ... dolng (bacer), precisely
the pseud.o-doing that appeared to us earlier as t he very
common but very profound e~presslon 'hac.. que •• hace'
(pretenA), that 1s, we hal"'.tually pretend to live, but we
do notaotuall,. live our genuine life, the lite that we
should have to live it, freeing ourselves fram all these
·in terpreta tions accepted by the other people .....who are
commonly called 'society.' we from time to time made pnergetlc and clear oontact with our lite as radioa reallty.22
From all this

~V1OU8

discussion, ortega conoludes,

again~

Max Weber and Illrkhe1m, tha t soclal reality must be distinauished
not only from individual but also from Inter-individua.l action.
"The soolal appears not, as has hitherto been believed a.nd was
far too obvious, when we oppose it to the individual, but when we

20~., n.JAO ..

21

!lli. ,"'U~ . . l2Q ...

'.

..
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contrast 1 t w1 tb t ~e Inter-Indi vidua 1. ,,23
Aocordlngiy,there are three levels of human behaviorl
In~ividual.

the

the Inter-individual and the sooial.

These

/'

leve,ls are irreduoible when they are oonsidered abstraotly,
,j

j

1.~J,

but in real 11fe, they 1ntermingle with one another.
,/"

I

.

f

/

I

. - ---.----

·/Coercion of the'social .;;;,..;.;.;;...;....;...;:..
facts. A further characteristIc of the

;"

usage, or soclal faot, whioh is partloula rly relevant to poll tiI
?

cal sociology and oul tural anthropolog7, Is t he moral at rain.
Ou~

determinatioa to llve in a soolety implIes a whole

usages. to whioh
, we must neoesaarily adjust.

1/ thi, moral'compulsion of the
!

people, everybody.24

usages~

var~y

of

But who exerc+ses

The oollectivity, the

Ortega mentIons an example where this

i:mor"l compulsion can be better recognIzed..

Suppose we try to

or~s8

the street and a p.olioeman halts us.

wo~ld

say, it is not the polioeman as an individual who forbids

us Itowalk.

CertAinly, ortega

The polloeman 1s a mere public Inft rument of an

organization: the government, fDolet1, the. people.

Now the

\

pe<l\i"'1s~'eve:t1tbOdy

and nobod1 in a oertaln way.

And we ask ourselves: who Is the subjeot of this human
actj nY' ~,h~t we call 'to forbid t to oommand lestl1y? VJho

-

23 Ibid_, p. 179.
24 "Well then, who 8 ays what 1is said"? Obviously, each
one of us; but we way what we say i~ the sam& way that the pollcenan stops us, we eiay it not on our account 9~;6W. account of th1s
unse1zable, indeterminate, Sl'ld impos sible Laut~;1A~1 people, societl
the collecti v1 ty." p. 173.

forbid. ua' Who commands us? It is not the man po1ioeman
nor the man S5)erintendent, nor the man Chief ot ~~ate
who is the au ecf or this action of foro!dd!ng:and command~--we-say--come from the state •
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
But then who or what is this state that commands me
and stopa me trom crossing from one sidewalk to the other'
If we put this question to someone, we shall see him
begin by spreading out his arms in. a swimming gesture--which
is what we commonly do when we are going to say something
vague--and he will say: "Why, the state is everything, sooiety, and co11ectivity."25
Physical force and us.~es: The Government. Somebody could objeot
!hiE tSe governm-eDt has notHIng to do w!fih social tacts. However
political .ws are 1ega1ized usages that have a stronger degrtt
of coertion.

It is agreed among tho political scientists that

one ot the essential notes at governmental activity is preoisely
the use ot physical coertion.

Moral coertion consists in the

pressure that SOCiety exercises upon the individual for the altntananoe of its usages.

The coertion that usages carry in them-

selves can be very slight, but to break any kind of usage always
involves some sanction.

One case of alight

c~ertion

would be

the lover that does not want to use the comm0q6xpressions ot his
society to communicate his subjective feelings. 26 In such a case,
the lover is condemned to solitude.
When, on the contrary, usages are strong they are reinforced
by physical law.

Strong usages are called vigenci!.!, and theY'

25 Ibid., pp. 171-172.

-

--

26Ortega, Man and People, (New York, 1957), pp. 223-224.

become public opinion, and the latter, in its own

t~n.

'7
becomes

power. 2 7 aence we have related in one and the same system of explanation sociology

and

politics as two classes ot soc1F1 tacts

difterent only tn degree.
Fact.

~

than real.

e!planation. The toregoing explanation is more logical
In real llfe, the process ot human behavior beglns

with usages and ends up in recollection (ensimiamamlento).
Man
.
does not begin his human li~e with the strong eftort to became
recollected and to retreat from hi. milieu.
s1mismam.iento there must exist a societ,..

-

Previous to the enBy breaking off trom

this 80cietJ, to which he has adjusted, the individual becomes
an exception and hls self develop..

appear, and the ",.." is the first.

The "I" is the last thing to
This psychologioal observa-

tion i. described as tollows by Brtega:
Apparently our "I" is the last character to appear in the
tragicomedy of our lite. We have otten reterred to him,
but irresponsible, taking him for granted, so tthat we might
begin to understand one another. Nevertheless, I have .ereral tim•• pointed out that all the names I found myself
obliged to use tor the • subject' of living were inadequateJ
that it was incorrect to say that Man lives. We bave already
seen that original Man is the Other and that rather than live
he co-lives with us and we with him. But co-living is already a second and pre.umed reallty whertas living in radical
.611tude is primar,y and unquestionable.2~
Without a 8001al milieu, the

"I"

cannot emerge.

Robinson

Crusoe migrated to an island after he had lived in a normal society and formed an adequate concept of him.elf through other men.
Had he been lett in the Island at an early age, he would not had

27 Ibid., pp. 268 and
28 'O!'t1r a Man and Pe

reached the stage of a human person, according to ortega_

!£2! individual !2 social action: ex.!plaritl_ We
-Transition
stressed the fact that the usage. are born in the individual and
are progressively incorporated into society when they become dee.
personalized and lose their meaning.

However, it is clear that

not all individual aots come to be usages.

Vlhioh is thea, the

essential note of the usage with regards to its institutionalization?

It would not suffice to expLlin the insti tutiona1izatio

of usages

by

means of imitation.

The theory of Ward about

imitation has been proved wrong, because imitation is selective
and ,;ve connot eXplain and predict. until ''fe di scover the laws and
funotion of the . selective prooess of 1m.itation. 2 9
At this point, Ortega introduces his theory of exemelaritl.
In his studies of language-formation, Ortega describes the phenomenon of. exemplarity in this way: "Por a usage to be constituted
not all the individuals in a society need be ln agreement ••• It is
enough ll--consciously or not--those who oonstltute a certain num
ber are in agreement.
majoritarian error.

What number?

The majority?

This is the

Sometimes it is the majority; but at other

times--and nearly always.-is preoise1y a minority ••• whioh, by adoptIng a particular behaVior, sucoeeds, with a strange automatism impossible to describe briefly, in making that behavior •••

29 see Krech and Crutohfield, The0ti and Problems of Sooial
Psyohology, (New York, 1948), Chapter

1:--

--
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become that terrible and inexorable social force, a usage. n 3 0
tt::z;

A faw lines la tar, he calls this phenomenon Itbinding observance,
l~en

several people meet the next singular phenomenon takes place

Somebody stands out from the group and takes the iniciative.

He

says or does somethin:z interesting"which is adopted by the rest
of the group.

People imitate this individual action because it

satisfies some unconscious need, and also because the originator
of the a ction has a certain authority.3 2 The leader will succeed
if he is able to choose the course of action that fits the present social circumstances of the group.
accept~Jce

The conditions for the

of the individual action by the group aI'e therefore,

satisfaction authority consists in an interpretation of What the
group needs together with a power of exemplarity or suggestion.
From the side of the group-members, there has to bea qocility
or submission, so that exemplarity and docility are the two side

§~ the social process. 33 The process of socializationsta~ts out
in the core of the family.
models of behavior.

The child sees in his parents his

0

They are for him the prototype of humanity,

so to speak. 34 On the other hand, the parents have to interpret.

30ortega, Man and People, p. 210.
31 Ibid.
3 2 0rtega, ttEspana invertebra.da," Obras_ Completall, III (Ma
1955), 55 •••
33Ibid ., pp. 103-109.
p. 104.

34T5iO.,

the child's need..

Cluldhood ends when the parents cease to be

the only authority and become members of a larger sooiety.

At

this moment docility is reduoed as also Is selective imitation.
other values will have to be introduced into the scene to give a
foundation to the authrlty of the parents.

begins to deslntegrat..

The school, the peer-group, the

bttcome new social models for imitation.

an

Also, this authority
co~~unity,

They are looked upon

8S

e~le.

The social leader.

The true leader is the one who has the right

in sight into the real ci:;"'cumstance s and knows how to coorlinate
the efforts of many in order to bring about the end,

t!hen th1s

.henonmenon is extended to SOCiety the social ciroumstanoes of
the eroup become the soclohistorioal scene,

Na.poleon, Alexander,

Caesar, were not only men Who electrified the orowds (exemplarl!l),
ut they also were men who had a deep insight into a socio-historlcal. situ61tion.

They possessed a clear vision of the i"..lture in

erma of the present; the present being the anxieties and needs
h.t were unoonsoiously

~.lt

by their oontemporaries.

Thus, during the days of Caesar, Rome was orumbling beoause
t the lask of politioal imagination.

The nat10n followed an old

attern of po11tioal organization and expansion that did not square

T.hJ.s plan oonsisted in . looking at the bi. citie" as
he political focuses and at the ('.ountry

as

a mere rumsz.

ountrymen were forced to go to the o1tes in order to vote.

The
The

empire, on the other hand, was getting larger and larger.

The

provinces became so numerous that it was impossible to control
them.

The army had to be increased and as a consequence, the

political consciousness of the countrymen increased.
Caesar's oolutiont

According to Ortega,

Caesa~.

What was

main polItical

quality was a great mental clarity, to define the problem.

We

said at the beginning of this chapter that politios is constituted by a number ot abstraotions: law, the national, the internatinnal, etc.

Tbe main diffioulty in the art of politics is to

find,. til. simple, scherneof ideas with a social appeal and at the sam
time, capable of solving the great social puzzles.
Caesar "wants a Roman empire which does
~he

liO\;

"Hen,-that is,

live on Rome, but on

veriphery, on the provinces, and this implies the complete

supl"ession of the Oity.... State.'· 35 The historical leader haa his
hand immersed in the confused stream of socie-historioal tacts.
!his work of leadership that Oaesar exeroised alone, is performed
,in society by a minority that stands out from the crowd.

The

tun'cition of such a minority is historical and consist. mainly in
foreseeing the future.

Through a process of naturll seleotion,

societies become organized in the form of a minority-majority relation, and this minority is usually an aristooraol in the primi-

350rtega,

~ Revolt £! ~ Masses, p. 175.

tive sense of this word (government of the best one s), "This reciprocal action between mass and minority ••• is, to my judgment,
the basic fact of any society and the main agent of Its evolution
for the better or the worse. n36
Authoritl

~

foroe a!-normal functions

~

society.

There haa

to be something in common between a majority and a minority so
that sooiety comes to be and keeps together.

Ortega does not

distinguiah between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft as Simmel does,
because for Ortega, there is no such a thing as a mere spontaneou
organization of society.37

The moral or physical coercion that

usages bear, olearly indicate that the prooess of socialIzation
is not a natural one.

Accord1ng to Ortega, man is just as social

as antisooial, and SOCiety is constituted by a dominance of the
soolal foroes over the

ant1-~ocial

tendenoies.of men.

theory sooiety 1s not previous to a ssooiation.
sists in a will

~o

live in cammon.

In this

'rhe former con-

The people and the cultur••

says Ortega, are born when they have!"he determined will to do
80.

The striving for a common goal planned b7 a minor1ty,

stitutea society itself.

.on-

Such a common goal must be appealing

and practical if society wants to perpetuate itself.

It has to

change according to the signifioant cultural changes throughout
history.
Sheth

Sooiety is a dynamic reality that increases and d1m1ni-

Strictly speaking there is no such a thing as an immobile

1955)36~t!6~' "Espana invertegrada," Obras Campletas,III (Madrid

r·
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-

societZe sooiety is always a mobile one.""Its reality is purely

dynamic) something to be done, the community in action."?B Talk-

ing about Rome, Ortega also says: "Rome was a great vital enterprise Where everybody could collaborate. n39
Let us reflect on two implioations ·of this t ~~17 of society.
The first one, is that it t.nde to identify society with
society, that is, society politically organized
ment.

uride~

politionl~

a govern-

The second is that, by making society depend on the plan of

a minority--a minortty that Ortega oalls frequently the intelleot-

-

uala--suoh a theory beoomes a kind of ideological determinism.
We will see later on which are the implications ot these two pointlS
with regards to political eociologz and sociol0§Y
Unity

2£ 2. Eoints 2!. departure

~

sociologz

~

~

knowledge.

anthropoloV.

V\1hen we referred to the usage as the Bocial aot p tar excellence, we established a parallel betweQn sociology and cultural anthropology.

Let us see now more olosely this relation.

For Ortega cultUre is nothing more than as aspeot of the aooial fact.

If we make the lattep the material object, oulture, we

would say, looks at this material object aa a produot at human
reason, rather than as a means of communicat10n and sooial inter-

38Ortega,

-

The

Revolt of the Masses, p. 184.

-----

39 Ortega, "Espana invertebrada," Obras Completas, III (Madrl<
1955), p. 56.

oourse.

The first thing that man does when he reflects 1s to or-

der the phenomena around him sO that he might carry out his plan

ot action.
omena.
cept.

To perform this plan, he has to catalogue the.e phen-

The cultural act par excellenoe is, therefore, the conThe ensimismamiento creates ideologioally what will be-

come later teohnique, usages

and

sooia1 aotion in general.

out oulture, the oosmos becomes chaos.

With-

"Besides the oontinuous

need of a hierarohy. without which the ooanos becomes ohaos, I
cons14er very urgent, that we direct our attention and refleotion to what surrounds us.

Man is at the utmost of his capaoit-

ies When he aquires full consciousness of his circumstances. n40
After the act of reflection man comes back to the world with a
plan, but most important of all, he comes baok with a feeling of
seourity_

Now, man has grasped the dangers and facilitIes and

possibilites of aotion.

Culture, whether it be material (teohni

que)tr formal (norm., thinking-patterns, language) is the W8:'1
man oontrols his environment.

"Culture," says Ortega, "is not

the whole life, but the moment of seourity, firmnes8 and olarity_
We invent the concept as an instrument, not to substitute for tb
spontaneity of life, but to seoure i t. n 4l

And in another place

he explains what is the meaning of this olarity: "Clarity means

40ortega, ".editaoiones del Quijote," Obras Completas, I
p. 319-

4l Ib1d.,

p. ;56.

45
quiet possession, dominanoe of our consciousnes8 upon images and
anxieties caused by the objects that threaten us. tt42 coneepts ape
the necessary condition for the creation of any material
of the environment.

But man needs also an intellectual oontrol

of his circumstance for its own sake.
to live.

cont~ol

Man has to have a reason

He asks for an explanation of everything.

Material cul-

ture is only the condition for refleotion, aocording to ortega.
Instead of living immersed taking oare of our needs, we invert
something so that the needs can take care of themselves, so to
speak, and thus we oan reflect.

"Technique is not the adaptation

of the subject to his environment, it is rather the oontrar,r, the
adatation of the environment to the subject. ,•43 For man, being
1s never a goal.

Man $eeks for a well-being, and it is thi. well-

being that justifies his life.

The product of ensimismamiento is

an individual action is potentially socIal. bedause it is directed
to other men.

The reason for this is that our life is threatened

by everything around Us.

Our tendency to survive impells us to

make allies out of people around us, in order to preserve our
lives together.

"I am Me and

my oiroumstance," is the famous say-

42 Ibid., ;57.
43 Ortega, "En8imismamiento y alteraoion," Obras Completas, V
(Madrid. 1955), '26.

~~------------~
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in oulture, says Ortega, are caused by dlfferences in the spirit

of creativity or barbarism of each country,

The period of in-

vasion of the German10 raoes is the period of great culture-torma
tion that builds the different Europoan nationalities. 47 This
culture.formative period produces its results in the beginning
of the middle ages.

liThe middle ages l'Vere personalist," says

ortega. 48 Honor ~~d right, law and war, are studied by ortega in
their areat! va prooess.

For purpose of brevity

we

must ommit

these socia-historical studies that const! tute, so to speak, the
main bulkwark of verification of all these ideas. 49
The conclusion soams to be that culture and barbarism are
identically important for the maintenanae of the historical tlux.
Ortega seems to identify creativity with lawlessness.

CreatIvity

implies, it 1s true, some escape fram old molds, but not necessar
11y from law, if law is understood in a

47 ot-tega,

1954),

dJ~amio

form.

"Espana. Invertebrada," Obras 0?MPletas, III (Madrl

pp. 110-112.

48

ortega, I1Notas del vago estio," Obras Oompl.taa, II (Madrl

1954> t p.

4901'.

420 passim.

ftMedltaciones del Quljote," Obraa Completas," Obras'

C?!K1etas, I (Madrid, 1953), pp. 309-401. and "Xi'tUhllos" tsla.
PP. 170:263.
----
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CHAPTER III
THE P0LITICAL SOGl: OLOGY O? ORTEGA
~

tield

~

Political ,Soolo1o§l:

an inter-disoiplinary field.

Political sociology eonstitutes

The politioa.l

~eienoes

are a number

of diseiplines that prepare the seientist and the politioian tor

political evaluation and political aotion. "whether political
science l8 considered as an art or a soienc~ or both, we may alill
ways say that it helps people to better undEirstand problems of

our time and to solve them. .
polItical science 1s considered by man,. sociologists as a
branch of general SOCiological theory.

Thus We'er desoribes it

as that part ot sociology having to do with Dower and physieal
foroe: "Ultimately one can detine the modern state sociologically
only in terms ot the specific means peouliar to it, as to every
polItIcal assocIation, namely, the use of physioal torce."l Weber
does not only apply to polltioal phenomena the same methodologieal
tools be uses in soolo1ogy, but he treats a great deal ot polItical

-

matter8 group.d under l ....r 800iologloal problem ••2

Hi. main

lMa.x Weber, "Polities as a voeation," From .Max Weber: EssaI8
1n SOeiology, translated and edited by Gertn-ina-l!l1. (New for I

1958),
ed

pp.

77-78.

The0j1. of So01a1 and Eoonomio Orr,an1zation, translatHenderson ( ew-York, 19471; pp. ;41 •••

ZWeber,
by

48
studies were direoted to the problem of political authority and
politics as a vocatton and an intitution of sooiety.
Parsons following the same trend, considers the power alemen
as a concrete case of his general theory of aotion. "Neither pow.
in the polittcal sense," he says, "nor the operation of governmen

as a subsystem of thesoolal system can be treated in terms of a
specifioally specialized conceptual scheme
tha.t of economic theory.lf;

of

the awne order as

And Mills focuses it as a special

case of the problem of values in sociology.4

Politics as an art,

or as a theorJ of action. involves the knowledge of the social
sciences among which sooiology plays the most lmpoirtant role.
aide. the general stUdies of groupe and

1nstitu~ions,

t'amily

Be
alld

oommunities and minorities. there are a number of social problems
that by tb1er nature, are more related to politics.

Such are the

atud 1A s of social movements, social oontrol, authority, bureau-

,.,.,

,"-~

cracy, electoral trends and many othera. 5 "The term, Political
Soc1010gy," 8ay8 Bernard.

It

is relEt ively new in this country, but

it has long been in use in Europe, where a number of text books
bear that name."6 Among those European countries listed on the
3Talcott Parsons, The SocIal System,{Glencoe, 111inois,1952),
p.126.
-------4gee seymour Martin Lip ~t, n Poll tical Sociology, 1\ Socl010p:
Today (New- York, 1959), PJil.X~!..112.
50. ',~rrlght Mill s, The Soc1 (')lC'glc~l Imaglna tion, (New York,
1959), p. 178.
--- --,
6L. Bernard, n~ Field 2! Poltical SociolgZ," l.. ~. !!:.!!'
III (1

8), 1

•

r-
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I

,ame page, he mentions Spain.

The groundwork o£ Poltiotll sool-

010g1, continues Bernard, ia sociolog1cal, but its aIm is politioal.

The subject that has been studied perhaps with most interest

bY polltioal sooiologists is sooial movements.7 "SOciety means
a system of ortered relations ••• socIal regulation i,s always pre.

sent, for no sooiety can exist without some oontrol over the natlv
impulses of human beings,"

McIver says,

The same author seem. to

consider Poltioal Sooiolgy as the study ot a partioular type of re
gulation or control of society.8
The dirferenoe between SOoiology and Political Soience 1s
based on the traditional distInction between man and oitizen,
socIety and atate. 9 But suoh a distinction, as Lipset points out,
is based on the old political theories o£ the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries whioh pr~ved wrong throughout history.10 The stat
;

1s nothing added to sooiety, and ita presence only meaha that such a
a society is politioally organized, which means just that it ia a

7 Rudolf' Heberle, sooial Movement s (Wew York.. 1951), and
!obert M. McIver, The Web
OOvernment (New York, 1958).

or
-------~oIver. The Web of 80vernment .j.
-----......... ....
~--

22.

9Llpset, "political Sociology," Socl010Eg Todal (Ne .. York,
1959), p. 82.
lOIbld.
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sooiety_

For, excepting the primitive historical period •• we

can say that without politioal organitation there is no society.
This does not mean that the same reality oannot be looked upon
from a different angle by the sociologist and by the political
scientist.
~

n-.ltanschauung" aEproach

t~

politioal

pheno~ena:

PolItical

soienoe as an art is not a modern phenomena. But the knowledge
that it requires has varied impressively thoughout history. Until

ty~

oenturies ago, the only soientifio knowleAge relevant to

the art of government was histo17 and warfare.

'l'oday something

more is required to taoe the present oomplex polltioal problema.
PoJtioal SooiologJ oan oontribute as no other sclence to adequate
politioal decisions and judgments.

But such political deoi81ons

today require eomething more than the data of these sooial 80ie
oes.

Mar,nheim has stressed the importance ota 80cl.10gy of know-

ledge that provides a prespective or

~eltanschauuns·in

order to

meet present political d~mands.ll
orteaa !! !

Politioa~

Sociolo§ist: In what sense can Ortega y

Gasset be called a po".t!cal Sooiologist?

Ortega's studies in

this area constitute one of his main oontributions to sooiology
to the present day.12

Tha text--books

that mention him consid-

er him almost exolusively a political sooiologist.

Ortesa has

llKarl, Mannhelm, Ideoloil and Utopia (New York, 1959), pp.
lO9-18~.
--1d2 w••ean that 8ame other sooiological ~tudieStmfY be ~ore
ons i erea 1n t h e rut ure. The resent _orK alms at
goa~.

h.
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studied a number of political questions that go from the e],ectoral techniques to his great thesis of Revolt of

~

Maese8.

The point of view that prevails in all those work. in his general
thesis about political facts that he describes in this fashionl
"Nei ther this volume nor I are pol!.tiolI1l18.

The ract 1. that

what we talk about here, is something that is previous to politics and belongs to its background. ttl 3 This background ot the
political rects for Ortega, Is clearly the sooiological constitution of society.

For all the political ..arks of Ortega are

unintelligible without his theory of usages, association and
emplarity.

.~

As a matter of tact the political works of Ortega are

a mere application of all his sociologioal studies to the polIte
loal facts of today.

"The state,tl says Rubio, !tis theretore the

most external form of the collectivity, something like the superlative form of the 80cia1."14

Let us remenber What we said at

the beginning of the second ohapter about politioal faots.

Pol-

itical facts are abstraotions that stand for soolal realIties,
rumd the only way to study them scientifioal1y is to penetrate the
nature of their basis: the sooia1 faots.

13

.

--

This oorresponds to the

ortega, La rebelioD de las masas, p.

25.

l.4aub1o-Hernandez, sociologia y politica e!: Ortega
(Barcelona, 1958), p. 32.

1 GaSSEtt
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modern studies about myth and the State.15 The state is based on
general usages that Ortega calls beliees, and that constitute its
justification.

f!

By JlIItths," McIver says, "we understand the value

impregnated beliefs and notions that men hold, tha.t they live by
or live for.

Every society is held together by a. mpth, a complex

of dominating

thoug~t-forms th~

activities. n16

determines and sustains all its

And among these activites, one is politics.

All

this will appear more clear in the next few pages and especially
in the chapter about the soctology of knowledge, that should be
related to the matter pzesented under consideration.
Leading themes o!-Orteia's Political Soclolo~:

The bulk of the

ptlitical work of Ortega is constituted mainly in these three es.

1h!

says; listed. in order of importance:

Invertebrated

~a~ and ~ ~

Revolt

!!! StIles

.2! ~ Masses,

in Politics. (If

we in

vert this order we have them lined up chronologically). The pol.
Itioal ideas of Ortega y Gasset, however, are spread throughout a
his essays.

The Revolt ot the Masses 1s the best known of his po

..........

1tioal works.

_ _

I

This book is nothing more than a look at present

European dond1t1ons i'rOl1l a sociologioal point of view.

It begins

by saying; "One of the most unforturnate things of our times is
that when the people from the lJast face the terrible conflicts of
toda~

publl0 life. they have fouqd themselves stuffed with a

15Ernat Oas8irer, The Myth and the state, (New Baven, 1946).

---

16MoIver, The \Yeb of Government, p.

4.
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primitive

equi~eDt

or erroneous notions about what society. the

collect1vity. individuals. usages, the law and justiceare."17

M!E.

and People

the tool

~or

!!!.9. !l!. pol:1t1oal

the interpretation of this work

pol1tioal essays.
write Man

~

implications;

~ ~
ju~t

People is

as for all othe

In spite of the tact that Ortega intadded to

People as an introduotion of a work that never

own.

out, from the last few pa.ges of the essay and from the referenoe.
to it of many other works, we oen reconstruot the main COUl'se of
transit10n from the sociological aspeot of usages to their politI
(

ioal aspect.

!h!

Sociologioal Approach

12

Political Facts:

Two

of' the fea-

tures of usages were : first, their impersonal charaoter and second, their co.roian.

I want to oross the street but I find my-

self inhibited by a oustom or law.

This inhibition is primordi.

ally due to a moral pressure of a sooial charaoter that oan become at times physical also.

In the oase of the lover that

we

mentioned before, we disoovered aqlnfirnal degree of illoral coercion in so far as he could not express his feelings.

"But sooner

or later--and this is important to be not1ced--there exists the
eventuality of physioal foroe."18
The second charaoteristic of usages, namely their impersonality, has to do with the subjeot of their coercion.
cises this authority?

Who forbids us o_oasing the street?

17La rebelion de Ian masas 'PP.

18

lji,'ho exer-

--

13-14.
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And this power, w.h1oh generally manifeats itsel! wi th euphem1sms of moral coeroion and P NSSUI'e, of oausing us moral
damage, but Whicb in the end alwa78 threatens with the eventuality of a physical violence--this power, which, then,!s
physical, brutal, whioh--as we shall se.--alao funotions
brutally, this power that belongs to no on., that Is no hltm.
that, in t:.is sen •• , is something like gravity thltt ~...
the l1teless mass ot the star in its oourse--this power 1.
the Iso01&1 power.' And 'soolal power' tunotiona In the
coercion that is tusage. t1 9
At first glanoe, the state appears as something abstraot, impersonal, distant.
oratic

gove~nt,

ot oourse, in a oountry oonsoious or its demopeople will say that who commands and forbids

Is the people, all of us, beouas. we are the·· state.

But what part

i

or dimension of us?
a1 lite.

Certainly not our private or even interperson

Yet to say that usages, in general, exeroise ooeroion in

the rorm of politioal foroe would not be true.

The family, the

school, and many other sooial institutions that are souroes of
usages, exeroise a moral coeroion acoompanied at times by physical
torc..

Ortega has to introduce here another distinciton in the

so01al taots,

n'his shows us ••• that usagea can be classified as

'weak or strong. t

'rheae two degrees of force in usage are meas-

sured by the toroe manitested In the accompanying ooeroion."20
strong usages have to do with publio opinions and vigeneias, Vigenoiaa are
port.

alao called norms and they bear a strong moral sup-

They are the main oonstituents of publio opinion.

Ortega
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desoribes this phenomenon as follows:
Both these things-... being an lml)fM~,_r. aDd being a reoours. .
implJ that sooiety is, in essenoe, power, and insUperable
power faoing the individual. ;:'ublic opinion, 'reigning'
opinIon, has this power behind it and makes it funoiton 1n
the various forms that corresopand to the various dimensions
of oolleotive existenoe. This nower of the oollectivity i.
publio power. 21
.
At th$ bog1nrdng this privilege of using physical coeroion
tor the sooi£), oontrol of usages 1s lei.'t out to the private re-

sponsibll:1ty of: the tribe and the oommunity.

on

an~

But as time goes

soclety grows in number and complexity, physioal power

beoomes institutionalized.

rEhestate is the substitution for th18

power ot the oommunity.22
When the realm of physioal foree becomes institutionalized.
the power in the hands of a rew tends to inorease and eorrapt it

there is no social control over it.

Vv.hatever form this sooial

oontrol takes on, it will always be &1$11'ioial if it is not based
on the social fUnction and nature at the state.

According to

Ortega liberalism 1s the only politioal rl;:>ctrlne that respeots
thLa~soolal function and nature of the s~at•• 23 His arguments in
~

,

o.,•.":-.mse of l1beralism:'are based on sooial:. considerations ot its
t

21 I bid., p. 269_
22ortega, ~ ~ people, j. 269.

288.

23ttv1eja y nueva po11tica", Obras Completas, I (Madrid, 195,;)
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socio-historical origin and meohani sm.

iJ've skip thi s part of

ortega's thought becuase it 1s fairly known and could induoe many

to rejeot his whole politioal sooiology, whioh_ for the most !,Rl't.
oan be considered independent of his

political~!tlon8.

'rhe important point to be considered in all this doctrine of·

usages and strong vigencias is that the
on culture,

po~ical

racts are based

Nowadays, used to the bureaucratization of modern

states, we tend to oonsider the government as a mere instrumental
and aWninistrative organization anat is able to solve all its doastia or internal problems in its own sphere.

Ortega says about

public opinion on which the state is oonstituted.

It

Our social

environment, \'lThich is full of words, of things said. is
full or pplnlons. tt 24

ipso

These opinions are most intimately culture

in the i'ull sense of the word.
e~

~

Culture is what '.va take for grant

and what is thought to be the common beliet of a country.

And

it is the biding force and coercion of this belier that .onstitutes the state.
If we contemplate the countless ideas or opinions that forever hover and buzz around us ••••• we shall observe that they
can be divided into two great classes. some of them are
said as something that is self-evident and in saying them
the speaker is conf1dent from the outset that they will be
accepted by what is called teVer.1Dodyt. Other ideas or 0p1n1ons, on the contrarr. are uttered with the more or lese
definite suggestion that they are not accepted opinIon., or
sometimes as oompletely and confessedly opposed to con~only
accepted op1nlohs. n2 5

ortega goes on show1ng how afraid PtoPle are of disagreeing

-

. 241W4...,,, Jh..··264.

25

57
with "everybody" and means that they do not need support and baoking from partioular individuals or groups,. but tha"

on the con-

trary they impose themselves on everyone."26

!!!!.

This cultural or socio-

Gultural approach.l2 Eolltioal facts:

logioal approach to po]tics is what makes Ortega wr1te: "The governing classes during oentur1ea--save for a short per1od--have
ruled wrongly not beoause of chance, but because the Spa1n thoy
were ru11ng o\"er, was as siok as they."

In other words, the

problems in po11tics. that are transcendent and not maeely sporadic, are the result ot more profound soc1010g10al tactors.
logioally
majority.

spe~tng,

s~oolo

society 1s polarized around a minority and a

The oause of the ill functioning or the society oan be

the laok ot a good minority, 'or the lack ot respect for them on
the side of the lajoritJ together with lack of docility and discipline.

A great number of t oda,.18

political problems do not re-

sult from economio end political -,urces alone, but from forgetting about this
tor. tor

f~ct'

whioh Ortega mentions.

lnter.na~nal

political decisions lies outside the pol-

itical &phe" and belongs to the

p~oblem

national character of eaoh country.

of understanding the

What i$ the reality of this

national character according to Ortega?
mind of person?

One of the main tac-

Is it l type ot cammon

The national character Is oonstituted by some

oommon beliefa of a countryts people about what should constitute
their speCial

wa,.
•

of lite.

public opinion, over a period of many
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rears, constItutes a national credo to which people submit.

The

$\ibm.sion 1s not an automatic process. but depends ontha a.bility or the minority to rule and on the correct use cf physical
force that, by lts very nature, loa. along with public opinion.
Ph;pJical force

~

.2

state:

Physical force, aocording to Ortega

is never something to be looked down upon.

The Philosophy of

physical .fo;t-ce is more complicated than appears a.t rlrst sight.
Society, we:1:siad before, is al\'V'ays a. Victory of the sooial forces
against the

''ll

+;1«ocial.

vJhat philosophers say about the social

nature of man, says Ortega, could also be said about the antisocial nature of man. 27 "A tone time or ano ther, tt he wrl te S,

-all men have felt longings to flee from society.

n almo s t

But the vivid

image of the effort implied by a solitary lite ••• is enough to suppress the impulse to flee. tt28

Ortega examines the tendency to se-

clusion from society as the natural way by which societies are
born and expanded.

Jmat keeps society together is the coercion

that usages exercise upon the individual, and this coercion samep
times cannot be moral alone but must depend on the ability of the
minorities to use physical force in an intelligent way.
are born, says Ortega, when they have the _will to do so.
will will does not arise spontaneously.

27 Ortega,

28Ibid •

••

!!.!l ~

Peop 1e, p. 227.

People
But tht",

Rather it is imposed to
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the mass pressed upon it "like the oil in the automobile. f1
With the foregoing motapolitioal basis that sociology has
provided, Ol"tega examines a number of political phenomena.

lie

will only mention the three most important ones, namely the oon

oapt of nation, the sociology of war, and the revolt of the mas

2£.2

Revolt

The
.........

Revolt _
of: the
_ Masses
.r ortega rejects the old definitions of th

l¥1asses

~

.!!:!

~

theory about

~

nation: In his

nation f:or f:ailing to provide us with the real origin and constitution of a c01llltry.

They rather pointed out a.ccidental factors

which usually accompany the notion of nation,

The oommon origin of the people Wi thin the boundarie s of one
country Was one of the points the ancients emphasized most. The
Romans. for instance, called their VO'Wltry ian'!_ "Itft , namely
the state, n is not a horde or a tribe or other societie:3 based
on consanguinity which nature takes on itselr to rorm w:f.thout
the collaboration of human effort. tt 29

Not only has the m.odern

phenomenon of the birth of countries like switzerland and Canada
denied this conoeption, but so also has the very beginning of
Western civilisation.

Rom.anization is an old concept and an ex..

ample of what we call today nationalizatiion.

It Illeans the unity

c.

within ona state tt suCh different countries as Spain, France.
England, and Africa.

So Ortega. rightly stat eSI

ItO

n the contr&l7.

the state begins when man strives to esoa.pe from the natural soc-
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iet,- of which he has been made a member by blood.",o
Another main oonoeption of nation oonsists in wr.at bas been
oalled the natural boundary theory_

Thle theory state. that what

oonstituted the modem nationalities was a result of a long prooess of wars and oonquests between countries,

During these

~r"

they had natural hindrances for their campaigns against other
tribes and province._

These hindrances were the natural boundar··

les that exist today between the different nations.

ortega finds

two thing. wrong with this position:
The historic reality of the tnatural bJundary' consist s simply in beine a hindrance for the expansion of the countt'y A.
and over country B. Because it is a hindrance for-the co~
try A, is also a defense for B. The idea of 'na.~iU. bound.'
a1'1t. implies naively, as more natural even than tl';e ol"Ul1dary!
the possibility ot: an unlimited expansion and tusion between
countries. As it seems, only a natural hindranoe is an obst~ole to them.;l
~ll1il!:r:ly
"

.......,."

Ortega refeots the theory that defines nation in

,:j,.

terms of so11, language, etc ••
th.t;. '.:",,_

hii';iG

All these definit1ons, Ortega

btcJ main d1ffioulties.

nal to the life of the nation.

First, they are factors exter-

We have to look !'or a justifioatiOl

of the state, in 1ts daily life. beoause it 1s a human reality and
as such it mu?t have a self-explanation, in the way it operatas.
"It is neoessary to resign oneself to look for the seoret of the

30orteg~, LfEebelion ~!!! masaSA p. 137.

-

31Ib1d.
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national state in its peculiar inspiration as such state, 1ri it.
own policy and not in some foreign principles of a biographIcal
or geograph1calOha»acter."32

But besides being peripheral, those

old deflnitions are static end belong to the past not to the present.

The state is not something estatic, but a movement. It 1s

something that either inoreases or deoreases.
it is founded upon, it is mobile.

Like the sooiety

If we out this movement by

means of abstractions, we will only see the terminus.a quo of the

movement.

The essence of the state, in this case, will

9.pT'·:1'lI'

a.a

a uni'ty of people which is found on a material thing like idiom,
blood, boundary.

But if we look into the future we

i~~ediately

see that this community which we have called state, iR striving
towards sor,ne end.

More than that .. 'in this projec,t. it tries to

overcome that unity of the past, which we thought constituted the
state itsel:f.

lfJben the drive toward the future dies, the state

itself ceases to exist.

That is why all the

were definitions of the state before the

\ttl1tie~s

Sta~A

of the past

was accomplished.

but now they are realities and rea.lities can no longer be ideal.
and

goal••
The word ideal, therefore, is the keystone according to Or-

tega, in all this definition of the state, "The state is, no mat.
ter what:t!s form may be, the invitation that a group of men ma.ke.

to other human groups, to exeoute together a great enterprise.-33
But this doe. not mean that the past i. irrelevant here.

It only

amo'Lttlts to saying that it is important inasmuc!l as it influences
the tututre.

With the countries ot South America, ortega Inslsts

Spain has a common paat, but since i.t doe. not share with them.
a oommon project or future, the7 do not oonstitute one nation wit

Spain,

ings,

The past, aocordlng to Ortega, makes ua irreversible be.
History 1s never a repetltion, because h"ltoJ'1 is an ex-

perienc<9 and men do not like to oop7 In hi stor'J.

The European has been democrat, 11beral, absolutist, and
feudal. , • but he no longer
does not o«lt1nue in any
'I'he

~. ~

W&y

S!.ll this •

Doe •

thai mean the t he

being tho.e thing.?

Clear17 not.

European cont1nu.e. being all those thlnga, but he ls them in

the form ot having been them.34
Thls oan al.o be applied to the national levelt
To have common glorle. in the palt, a common will in tbe preeent J

to can7 out great thinge together, wanting to do .ome
b~lH)ld

the $8s80t1al conditlons to become a count!'J.

mON

thiDSS

In the palt.

inheritance. and glories; in the future, one progr. . to realis••••

Tho axiatenoe ot a count17 ls a dailY' plebiscite. 35
~tfhat

suppose.'

is the nature ot thls program that the state alwaYI pre-

liThe program i. a suggestive project ot common 11t••••

33Ib1d • p. 1'9.
;4orteia,~ hombre.7.!fsante,

p_

16~.

1955~~~7!ga, ttIUstoria como sistema,- Obras Completas, VI (Madr1<\

they," that is the oitizens, "do not live only in oammon for the
sake of living in common, but rather to carry out something together.":;6

Ortega mentions here the oonquests and expansion of

the Roman empire as something that oaused the strong national
unity of the Romans. 37

~lben the imperialistic fervor was strong,

Rome had a cause that just iried its own ex! stence.
spirit died, Rome oeased to exist.

When this

In Invertebrate spain, he

desoribes a similar prooess or expansion that oreated the Spanish national unity.;S

Since those are the only examples he gives

of the so-oalled program of oommon 11fe, his notion of nation
seems to be restrioted to tho.. oountries that possessed a

001-

onial or imperialistio goal in history.
~

80ciolo8'1 2!.!!!:.!. The sociology of

war

of Ortega is an ap-

plication of his notion of physioal foroe to the national and international level.

Ortega thinks that today's fear of war--he

wrote these ideas at the beginning of the oentury--is irrational.
Be oriticizes seve3iy

a type of paoifism originated in England

that wanted to avoid any type ot war at all costs.

such an at.

titude, Ortega writes, comes trom oonsidering physical vilence
as the only reality in Wd.

"I belIeve," he continues, "that the

;6Ortega, ~ rebelion ~
l

!!! masas, p.l4l.

37 Ortega, t:I Apuntes sobra el pensamiento, au terurgia y demiurgia," Obras Oompletas, II (Madrid, 1944), 537.
;80rtega, ~ rebe1ion ~

!!! masas,

j~ 130.
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terrible thing about war is that it is a puniShment inflioted up.
on the Europeans for not having tbought out oalmly about the na-

ture of war." 39

Violenoe is only a manifestation of the wills

end powers that came into conflict in a war.

War is not, in most

of the oases, the brute dominance of force over intelligence and
reason, but rather the external manifestation of a conflict of
wills and programs between two oountrles.4o

The determination

of a society to oarry out a program of common life, and the minorityts exercise of aubhority, both require if noces&ary the use
of force if necessary.
bes~

More than t hat, physical force if the

indication of the determination of this majority and author-

ity to overcome all obstacles and bring about its goal.

People

are born and heard this expression before when they have the in.
domitable will to do so; and this will is not firm if it does not

want to risk everything.

ltWar

is not the exercise of power by

one state, thus in general, but the concrete determination to exercise such power by means of violence and coercion.ul~l

Ortega

goes as far as saying that if any mono-determinism should be held
a.s an explanation oJ:" history, it would not be the geographic de-

terminism of Buckle or the economic determinism of Marx, but the
monodeterminism of war.41

War is the dynamic prinoiple of his-

40 ft Invertebrate Spa.in", Obras Completas, II (r,iadrld, 1954),
41ortega, "El genio do la guerra y la guerra alemana," Obras

~~~ta:.!8~1 II (Madrid,

1958), 205.

"Sombre e1 i'ascismo " Obras C
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toXT; something natural. to it, just as the natural functIon ot
any organism.

But this does not just mean that war is not a

sorrowful experience and should not be avoided wh6n it is not ne
88Sary.

"WtU'!' causes fatigue but not extenuation, it 1s a natura

function of the

S

oeia1 organism already prepared for thIs f'uno-

tion. n 43
The periods of war are periods of croatlvity and national!
formation.

DUring such peri:ds the usages of

S

oeiety ohange.

periods of peaoe are times of adaptation of the sooia1

tiona to the political

8hang.s~

introduced by previous

1n~ti-"i

w~r~.

is not hlat.rioal initiative or o'l'eativIty, but a manifestation

of

the soll.ity and determination of sdciety to remain unified.

Ortega is just

as

much ags.inst the modem theories of direct

aotion and government based on the mere Use of for'ce, as he is
against a b]'ind pacifism.

The former position its a mchiern phen-

omenon callad Nazism and Fasolsm that claims no other right,.

than violence without even bothering about a rationalization ot
its own position.

--------

-

'lJhese modern political theol"ies and the re-

volt of the masses are one a.nd the same thing.

"Under the

of syndioallsm. and Fascism there appears for the first time in

430rtega., tiEl genio de 1a guerra. ., 1& guerra alemana," 40.

..:.:';1'

"
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Europe a type of man who doe s not want to gi vo reasons or to be
right, but simply shows himself resolved to impose his optnlons~
The latter position departs from a statio oonception of society.
war is only a means to maintain a status guo,. Paoifism. shows a
oomplete ignoranoe about the whole historical

pr~oess

of nation-

"

formation, which is a prooess ot oonf1iot between raGes resulting
1n war.

This theory oonsiders the present status guo as a natur-

al and perennial state.

Even aooepting the taot that, atter the

formation of the present nationalities war should disappear. what
should we say about some oountries that appear late in history
when all nationalities are fonned?

:.abo is going to determ.ine the

boundaries of suoh countries, or how many nations there Should
be?

pacifi~

errs when it oonsiders international sooiety as an

equilibrium whioh is not a balance of powers
tion whiCh is the negation of 1if•• 45

b~

a statio ooncep-

In all this discus8ion

ar-

tega oonfesses himself a follower ot Kant, Fidbte, Schelling,
and espeoia1ly sohe11er.

H. disagre•• with the latter regarding

hi. ethic,a1 po£Ction.
In spite ot his rejection of the Darwinian conception ot
war, prevailing in hi s time, ortega

44Ortega,

!!!!.

Revo1!

45 Ortega.. _ftwotas
drid, 1954), ~8.

.2!. ~

t.

po 8i tlon 1 s heavily intl".

Mas.e., p. 80.

del vago estl0," Obrlls gomp1etas, II Uta-
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enced by the biological discoveries of his time, a tact that
seems to function signifioantly in the main arguments enumerated
before.

Ppysical torce

~

Rights. ortega-. SoeioloSl

~~

However.

Ortega does not think that the main question about war has been
solved with his for.goin::; arguments.

He believes that todaY'll in

deoisionsabout the use of torce 1s the s1gn of • lack of so11d
ideas regarding a more profound reality: the juridioal aspect.
During the spell and centuries a group of Frenoh people and Eng-

lISh philosophers suddenly disoovered the existence ot oertain in
alienable rights and dttle. that men had just by being born.

Al

though th.clatmed that those rights and obligations existed pri
to the state, yet, without the presence of the latter, the ••
rights seemed to be
ot

Rome,

complet~~y meanin~~e.s.

JUst as in the time

the peole derived all their social status from. their

oitizenship, so also is the ian 01' the post-French revolution
powerless to exercise any of
vigilance ot the Stat4h

~s

rights without the permanent

""

Thi.~\; "original

doctrine" of the rights

of man was a oopy ot the discqvery made by the Romans, an d ignored the long experience at _'hievementa in history.

This at-

titude consisted also in a reJ~tion of the spirit ot the MIddle
\~

Ages whioh were considered as
teenth Oentury thinkers

"

a~period

committ~

of barbarism.

two errors.

These Eigh-

The first consist.

eda notion of progress .s a neg~ion ot the historical past.
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"Progress does not consist in today' a annihilation of yesterday,
on the contrary, it consists in conserving the &ssenceof yeaterday that had the power to dreate a better today.n45
The second error had to <b with a false idee, about barbarlam.

AIS we said before, barbari am for Ortega's not only a. pe riod of
lawlessness and lack of normative bounds.
side of barbarism.

Byt

the". is

I~mcther'

is the negative

1~is
"l~de,

ct'''llplately forgot-

ten b7 the philosophers of ,the XVIII Century, namely, the aspeQt

of creativity.

Ortega predicted that our ideas on the Middle ASPS

were going to c...'1.ange wi thin a short time, and history has proved
him correct on this point.

Again, the Middle Ages are the period

of nationality formation and nationa1ttr ohange.
Since the

tL~e

of Spencer, Ortega continues, the spirit ot

war has been opposed to the sp 1ri t of industrialism in the same
~

way as barbarism is opposed to culture_

The spirit of war con-

sists basically in the attitude of creativity that far from disregarding the'danger; does not consider this danger as a sufficient motive to avoid a great enterprise.

The

1n1u3tt1~pir1t;"on

the other hand, ie se affected b,.:fear of war that it risks noth~ng

an d looks at war a threat tpylng 'to subvert the sta.tu,ir guo.

The spirit of war, though affected by fear of war in a rational

way, still considers its own determination to carry out a

ereat~.

450rtega, "Notas del vago estio," Obras Oompletas a II (Iadztt

1954), 428.

social plan, above the danger of war.
permanent vigilance..
selfconj!ldenee.

Life is conceived as a

The period o£ barbarism is a period of

Decadence is just the opposite.

are not con-

Vie

fident because we have lost the power of self-determination that
opens new historical paths.
ance.

V~

only want to keep a statio bal-

War is considered as a mere

tool against it.
militarS-ame

t~at,

and militari£M is our

"The Middle Ages,n says Ortega, "did not know

The military man is a degeneration of the warrior

corrupted by industrialism."46 - The concept of physical £orces 1
the Middle Ages is based on the ,principle: he who cannot de£end
his right, cannot claim the right.

The knight oannot rely on th

state for thB security of his own rights beoau.e publis life, in
the Middle Ages, was almost non-existent.

The king only solves

the most difficult cases of violation of, and con£lict between,
right.,

Private life 1s identified with publio life.

dle ASS' are personalist.

The Mid-

Rights are a gift and noble dignity

bestowed to the knight for his personal victories.

This concep-

tion of rights is fully resented in the castles, saJs Ortega.
"The castles symboli"e a daily struggle, life as a warfare.,,47
In the Middle Ages humanity makes the discovery of self-discipline, braveness,

and

gentlenes. that noble wa. always engender ••

460rtega, "Notas del vago estio,n'Obrs.. Complets.a, II (Madrid, 1954), 429.

47Ibid • p. 427.
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All these virtues were virtues of the citizen. during the time
of Rome; now they belong to the individual

a8

a private man. They

have travelled from the periphery to the oore of the people. Tne
important point to be remembered in this whole treatise, is the c . ."f
conception of rights in a dynamic faShion.
With the backround offered by these sooio-historical oonsiderations, the author attaoks the complicated problem of international peace and international rights.

The rights of the state

considered as a pe rson. should be oompared to the nature of rightl
of the individual.

Tbe readiness of one state to defend its own

rights is the best indioation or its ability to rule. nThis power
does ~ot consist in an intelligent, aX"~iatioJ or indusi#t'1al cap ....
acity.

Nothing of this sort cons·titut•• the specific power ot

the state.

The power is rather a peculiar kind of ene:rgy'and

00-

hesion among those who form a count:ry and among the different col
leotlvities that are conquered.

The long and painful proce •• ot

discoverr of rights 'during the Middle Ages., produoed future results in the creation of national constitution. in the XVII and
XVIII centuries.

The people, however, who wrote these constitu-

tions never looked back to the so-called ttBarbaric" ages that
made possible the

~mola

reality of rights.

One of the most ad-

vanced countries in the philosophy of rights Is England, according to Ortega.

England produced an unwritten const1tution that

became a model for many nations.

The development of suoh a con-
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oonstitution required great oonquests and wars, life
a daily stuggle.

oonc~ved

as

BJ.t the great paradox is that England, wholly

oblivious of its own past, has evolved the mod.ern

of

doctr:~ne

pacifism, whioh is a denial of her own historical experiences.
In the opinion of Ortega, all modem doctrines ot international right have failed to prevent war because of the basic erlOr
in the conception of individual rights that 1s extended to the
state. The only solution for international peaoe must be a dynamic and historical oonception of rights as an aohievement, and
the idea of physical force as the best indioation to keep these
rights.

This rather simplified conclusion of Ortega the histori-

cal and dynamiC origin of rights probably oontained in his mind
a great deal of ramifioations, but since he hever made them explicit, his eooio10gy of law and war, ends up in a very simjle
solution.

-

Social and political consideration about the Revolt of the Masse ••

------_ -

--

--

The Revolt of the Masses is one of the best known and oom-

............

-

.......

mented works of Ortega, and therefore we will
to make a rundown of his leading ideaa.

limit ourselves

This will be most in ao-

cordanoe with the purpose of this study whioh ia to give an aooount of the

.o~iologr

ot Ortega never exploited by his commenta-

tors.
Revolt of the Masses is the name Ortega uses to oharaoterize
--------the great mass-movement of the beginning ot this centurJ that oon
sisted in the "aooession of the masses to complete 800ial

pOWf_··~

73
er. n48

The revolt of the masses has ohanged completely the mod.

ern European way of lif5.

All the other political and social

changes must be oonsidered unimportant when they are compared to
the former mass-movement.

Its oauses are hidden in the Eighteen-

th and Nineteenth centuries) more sPecifically in the dootrines
of liberalism, scientifio expertaentation, and industrialism.

~

coming of the masses to power has produoed a type of man that

--

Ortega oalls the mass-man, with the following features: an outlook on life with all its technologioal and cultural

prorl').C~S,

a.s

a seoond nature; something that man finds out-there, and that he
has a right to. with oomplete inadvertence to the saorifices and
struggles tha t humanity haa gone throl18h to create.

As a conse-

--

quence the mass-man looks at his riehts as things of oaprice with
no regard to the fundamental facts that at all times should give
value to them.

--

The mass-man is rebellious by nature.

~e

has no

docility to the minority for which he has no respect whatever.
Life for him becomes something common that has los~ all the
of lIte created by the scrifices
of the
.
. ruling minorities.

The

ba.sie a.ttitude is that of a "spol1ilq,lchildtt that considers his
as necessary as as his food, as something he has a right to,just

because they lie there.49

The ma~"-l'"''''4 is·tm manvmo looks tor

"--

a definition of what he 1s in the crowd, who 1s nobody outside

-

--_

480Ft.ga, La rebelion de las mases,
......... p. 11.
49 Ibid., p. 90.
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the crowd.

Be learns bow to do everything as other paople do.

has no opinions of his own.

:S:e

In the world of the masses, quanity

repalces quality and crowds begin to invade theaters and meetinghalls. 50
it.

Authority becomes a mere representation o~ the masa-spi~

Bureaucratization means the disappearance of the ruling min-

ority and the use of authortty
mass.

The natural basia on

13.:3

~mich

a weapon in the hands of the
society is foUbd the minority-

majorityrelatlon, authority and exemplarity, docility and determination to live in common are placed by the reir.:;h 0:' the masses.
Basically the rebellion of the masses is the corruption of democracy envisaged by TocQueville. 51 The lack of initiative and norma
·.a natural result of a society where authority is not

esteemed~

and practivally the :Lack of complete cultural values characterized
by the coming of the masses result in these three facts synthesized by Oromi: "Free expansion of vital desires. 2) Radical ingratitude towards the rest or humanity. 3) Deep conviction that nebo
is superior to anybody.n5 2

-

Together with all these factors, there is the barbarism of
.
specialization.53 Per)ple have not only lost the notion o~ history

5l Tocquevll1e, Democracy

~ America, (New York,) pp.258-261.

520roml, Ortega y la Filosotia, ed. E.T. Cruz (Madrid, 1953),
p.252.
530rtega, ~ Revolt ~ ~ Masses, p. 119.
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and time, but they are no longer able to oomprehend the weltanaohauung of their politico-sooial realities.

The mass-man 1s not

an ignorant man, a worker, or any speoial olass member and this
makes it

80

much more the difficult.

ially understood the

wOJ."k~r8;

"By mass •• is not to be spec

it does not indlopte a social

ola.~

but a ktnd of man to be found today in all social classes, who
consequently represent. our

age, in whioh he is predominant,

~l.

ing pcwer.I~54 The typioal way the mass operates Is by imposing it
own rule with irrational force.
masses is direot action.

The sole po11tical teohnique of

The masses not only intervene every-

where; they 00 so violently, says Ortega.
the lack of "Auditive faculties."55

The

re~son

for this ia

~~en thi~ Is missing, cul-

tUre disanpears.
l!..!hen all these thing~ are lacklne there Is no culture; there
is, in the strictest sense of the word, barbari~. And let
us not deceive our~elves, this Is what is beginnln::; to app
in Europe under the progressive rebellion of the masses •••
Barbarism is the absence of standards to which appeal can be
made.56
The state becomes the uncontrolled ruling force, the tyran1cal rule of' the ljaJority.
only left a coup

~t

!!!!

Instead of revolut10ps now there is

that changes the subject of government

without changing the basic form and nature ot the state.

54Ibid •• p. 120,

55 Ibi9t"
56ortega;

~ Revolt ~ ~ Masses, (New York, 1938), P. 79.
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Since 1949, that is to say, slnce the beglnnlng ot the second
or bu~geol. iovernments, there have been no genuIne revolutlons In Europe. Not assuredly because the~e w.~e
no motive. tor them, but because there were no menae.. pubblle power was brought to the level of soolal power. GoodbKe-foreve~ Revolutions.
The onlz thing now possible y;-t eir opposite: £be ooup ~'!!!!.5·(
gene~atlon

The result is the oreation ot a State that ls based on pure
physioal force, like Bazlsm, Pasclsm and Bolah.visa,

During the

time of the great phl10sophical developments in Bad German,-. we
had scientist. and philosophers detendlng with the most limpliat.
io reasons the rightness' ot their government, who philoaoph,. ..s
the most ridiculous in hIstory.

ThIs total lack of norm, tyPIcal

of barbarIan, Is not as In the other periods' ot creativit,., becaus. the mas. does not have an,. plan, doe. not want lDlything.l' ,. ,
Decadence 1. a relative concept.

Ifattons become, decadent with re-

spect to oertaln ideals the,. Intend to realize.

But absolute de.

cadenoe is the lack of enthuslalll1 about lite, because of a laok at
program and inItiative.
The oharaoteristic ot our hour is that the commonplace mind,
knowing it.elt to be commonplaoe, has the assurance to proolalm the rights of the oommonplace and to impose them whereever it w.1l1. As the,. say in United States: .to be difterent
is to be indecent.58
Ortega thinks that the soolal situation i. very serious but
not an insolUble problem.

Yet he realizes that all solutions have

been superficial because they have be.n applIed in the mere periphe17: in the poli tioal sphere.

The solution he prop:ae. is the

57Ibld., p. 131.
58o~tega, !!!! Revolt!!!. the Masses, p. 18.
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European state, based on a common culture and normative system-all these are socio-cultural and historical tacts, Ortega write.-that the west has to re-discover in its own history.

He believes

that the national ditferences are minimal as compared with the
community in history ot Europe.

His unification of the west i.

treated extensively in his sociology of law, and is made dependent
on the dynamic conception of law that depends, in its turn, on a
historical consoiouaness that has to be aroused everywhere.

This

will bring Europe to the discovery of an identity in culture and
especially with regard to the formation and development of the
doctrine of rights of man.

This will also help societies to re-

discover the powerful minority and to accept its ruling role.
Only with the fulfillment of these conditions can a new society

-----

be born and the revolt of the ms.sses fade.
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CRAPTER IV
THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE OF ORTEGA
General considerations about
soc1010S1

£! knowledge

~

Sooiology

2£

Knowledge:

The

is a relatively new field in sooiology.

Marx was the initiator of the sohool, but the main systematio
treatment appeared with the work of Mannhe11l., Ideolo,,"

!.2!!.

utopiaJ

He was the one Who ooined the term, Wissenssoziologie. The Engli.
translation of this German term, sooiology

~

knowledge, aocord-

ing to Maquet, expands the somewbat restrioted German notion and
includes not only soientifio knowledge but any type of thoughtproduct. 2

This English term seems to apply better to what most

sooiologists of knowleQie have been doing.
kn~wledge

"The SOCiologists of

have not limited their inquiries to soientific know-

ledge. n 3
The sooiology of knowledge explores the existential basi. of
knewledge.
area ot

nThe Coopernican revolution," says Merton, !tin this

inqui~

consisted in the hypothesis that not only error

(this was the hypothesi. of Marx) but also the disoovery of truth
was sooially (historically) <landi tioned.,,4

Different philosophi-

lIde.logy and Utopia (New York, 1960), Mannheim, Karl.
2Maquat, The 100!OlOil of Knowledge, translated from the
Frenoh by J.P.~cke, lBos on; 1951), p. 4•
• Ibid.
h'Robert Merton.Sooial rrheorY' and aoola1 st~~ lGlAn

~'J:RI
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cal schools have emphasized, throughtout hiet0rJ, the logieo-cultural ori.in of thought. The very definition of philosophy as the
seience studying the ultimate principles of things under the light
of natural reason. does not seem to explicitate the fact that such
natural reascn belongs to

P~Qple

who-

~re

living in a socio-cultur-

al milieu.
We do not want to limit ourselves to philosophical thought
and we should arrive at the same conclusion with regards to sciences, art, and any area of human

knowle~ge.

Thought circumscribed

to its social context had never been given special consideration.
In the beginning of his Ideology

~

Utopia, Mannhelm talks about

the directive principles of this social science.

"This book is

concerned with the problem of how men actually think."5 So far
history of ideas

w~s

the only science encharged of establishing

relationships between phi::bsophioal and literary ideas and historical phenomena.

The central thesis of the socioloiY of knowledge

is that the history of idea. is still incomplete.

In order to

have an adequate historical knowledge of ideas we have to consider scientifically their socio-cultural dimension.

The social de-

terminant:'ot knowledge--what is called by Mannheim the group-determinant ot knowledge--can be restricted to small groups or to
a whole culture or historical epoch. 6

5 Mannheim, Ideology
6 IbId., p. 118.

~

In

Utopia. p. 1.

anr

case the historical
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factor will also have to enter into oonsideration. "Manifestly,
then, the sc:d.ology of knowledge is coneerned with problems which
have had a long history.

So muoh is this the case, that the dis-

cipline has found its forst historian, Ernst Gruenwald."? And
Mannheim saYSI
The ph1losophy of history whioh mostly treats histor1cal pe~
lods as units, overlooking their inner differentiation and
stratification, must be sUpplemented by a socially different·
iqted view of the historico-socil process as a whole, explicitly taking into acoount the distribution of social roles
and its significance for the dynamics of the whole. 8
The sociology of knowledge was first disoovered, as .e said
before, by Marx.

In his German Ideology, he set out to demonstratt

that the hlstoico-soclal envilDlment of a class or a historical ••
oonam1u system influenoes a determinate Lfdeology to the point

o~

the latter being a tool for the conservation of the former in a
determinate economic system.

There is a long lapae between thia

narrow ideological determinism of Marx and Sorok!n's work, Cultur-

!!

prnamios.9

In this interval we >disoover Levy-Bruhl, Durkhe1m,

Ricket, Troeltsch, all of whom were read by Ortega y Gssset.

In

7Merton, So01al Theo!l ~ Sooial stpuoture, p. 256.

~arl Marx, German Idaol0§l. (New York, 194?), p. 20.
9sorokln, so01al and Cultural Dynamios. III, (New York, 1937).
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addition, Sorokin, Merton, and, Znaniecki have contributed detailed
studies of special cases of the general theory of the sociology ot
knowledge. After these preliminary oonsiderations we want to treat
some of the main problems of the 800iology of

knowledge~

We will Uy to po&nt out the main sources of divergenoe from
the standpOint of the three elements that oonstitute a 80ci01087
of knowledge: thought, existential basis, and the relationship be.
tween these two. lO
The first element

££ ~

socl010*l

~

Knowledge:

Knowled~8

With regards to thought, we have already sefiD how a certain
'"

precision of this concept resulted from the

\YB.Y

in whioij the Ger-

man notion of wisaensoz!ologle is translated into EngliSh.

In

general it can be atated that the sociology of knowledge is not
concerned wIth those ways of
ally irrelevant and

p~s

fleeted in ideologies.
social reference.
sense.

thinklbi~' ;ClO

talking that are soci-

more attention to thinking-processes re.
This term ideology points to a hlstorico-

It was used by Marx for the first time in this
i'

:ith this name Marx directs a basic attack agalrist all

preceding social and political systems born, according to him,
wi thin a false social stl'ucture created by the struggle betwwen
classes.

V:Jhareby the concepti ideology ha.s taken on, in many post.

erior sociological writings, the cOlmotat10n of rationalization

•

in defense of the interest s of one class or e oonomic system.
lOri.quat, ~ Socl.logy

!:!.. Knowledge,

pp. 28 ..

,6.

"All

the ideas, true or false, have their origin and inspiration in
the material oonditions of' man ~nd his life-struggle," says Marxl
Marx will oal1 his system a soience, as opposed to ideolgy, and
will make the objeot of this scienee treat and interpret all past
ideologies.

In oontrast with German philosophy whioh desoends from heave
to earth, here we asoend from earth to heaven. That 1s to
say, we do not start out trom what men say, imagine, or eon.
ceive. We set qut from real aotive men, and, on the basis
of their real llt."proce.sB, we demonstrate the development 0
their ideologioAl reflexes and eohoes of this life.prooess. 1
Engel explained this general thesis ot Marx LIOdltying it wi

his positivistico-logical style.

Under such an influence, modern

textbooks on oommunism read in the following way:
If we deduoe dlfrernet ideological schemes not from
but only through our minds, from the real work, and from
pens in it, What this yields is not philosophy, but positive

ca. 1 3
However, for Marx, the idea of a soience independent from
any ideology involves, at times, more than one contradietion. 14
If his own criticism

or

past ideologies is also conditioned by the

800ial and economio struotures of his age, how oan he expect to
esoape his own arguments?

Communism as a general interpretation

of history oannot explain thnt history in a purely relativistio
llKarl Marx, German Ideology, p.

14.

12Handbook ~ Ma~xi .. (.ew Yo~k, 1953), p. 23'.
Karl., MArx .. German Ideolo ,OJeYl York, 1947), p.
Handoook 01'
••

14.

0

determ1n1st1c fash10n.
The ma1n polnt of all this d1soussion 1s that the term ideo-

-

<.

logy in the Marx1st sense has too many ph1losophioal oonnotations
to 04 introduoed uncrel10ally into the field of empirical solence.
Mannhe1m was the first to take pains at retormulating this Marxist oonoept10n.

He oreated a value-free terminology that oannot
~

t

o~

suooumb with the tailure

a philosophical system.

The notion

ideology is sp11 t into these two 800iolog1cal oategories: ideology and utopia.

We are nqt

inte~sted

here In the speoitio ter-

';

minology, for Ortega will
but rather 1n the basis
logr and utopia are

~fter

fo~

great d1fterneces in this point

this distinotion of Mannheim.

d1tter~nttated
:;

Ideo-

not by a criterion of truth or

,

va11dIty , but by a sooialitunction.
"I

Here we reter to the ideology ot an age or ot a oonorete hIs
orico-sooial group, e.g., ot a ol •• s, when we are ooncerned with
the character1st1cs and oomposition ot the total structure ot the
mind of th1s epoch or of this group.15
And a fa! pages later:
Only those ori..ntations tran:toending real1ty w111 be referre
to OJ' us as utopian which, when tijey
pass over into conduct, tend
r
to shatter, whether partially or wholly, the order of things preva1ling at the t1me. n16
15Mannhe1m, Ideologz ~ Utopia, p. 56.
16Ibid ., p. 192.

It is important to notioe, therefore, that the word utopia
does not correspond to what we dall myth, meaning an irrational
beliet of sooiety,17

This distinotion between ideology and u-

topia marks the separation of philosophy from sooiology and makes
Mannheim a
tions.

sooiolog~st

in spite of his philosophioal preoocupa-

The philosophioal questiona that Mannheim thought should

be treated in a sooiologr of knowledge are, first, the problem
of weltansohauung, and seoond, the epistemological basis of this
soience.

With regards to the former point, we might say that a

sooial psyohologist and an anthropologist oannot relate an attitude to a oonorete sooio-oultural situation unless they fully
understand suoh an attitude.

TIi. attitude, whioh is refleoted

in sign. and behavior, will have to be interpreted.

As a conse-

quence a communion with the oulture in question will be required.
In the same way the sooiologist of knowledge who studie 8 thought
patterns has a need to interpret them.

This is S)mething that

mere statistioal correlations oannot substitute for..

On the

other hand, the sooiologist is a scientlet and not· a philosopher.
SO the main differenoe will oonsist in
socIologist

inte~~t9d

the~e

two points: 1) The

in the so01010gy of knowledge will try to

understand, not to evaluate, the oorrelations between

th~ught

an

l7As an example see MoIver, The Web ot Government, (New Yor
1958), p. 4. or Cassirer, ~ Myth !2!! ~stat. (New Haven,1946)

p. 6.
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social strnoture •• 2) The understandIng of thought-products will
onl,. be a -Pl-erequisite for further conclusions outside the scope
of philosoph,..
?pistemological Bases

The second problem with regards to the

, first element of the sociology of knowledge: thought-process, is
the epistemological question,

Sociology- is not directl,. interest

ed in the critical problem of knowledge,

However, once we have

establiShed a determinate relation between social facts and
thought, we have indirectl,. made some philosophical statements.
This i8

~T

Merton, following Mannheim, believe. that espitemo-

logy has to be treated in some
IDlowl$dge. 1 8

wa,.

within the metasociology ot

Maquet has also studied this problem extensively,

but his interest 1s .-utte difterents "The relation between the
sociology o£ knowledge and the philosoph,. of knowledge.,,19 The
sociologists of knowledge are interested in the relation between
sociology and philosoph,. onl,. in so tar as they have to solve a
methodological problem and give validity to what-ever discoveries
the,. intend to make.

In a gener,l way we can say that the maln

thesis of the sociology of knowledge does not necessarily implicate a relativistic position in philosophy.

It is true that

-------------------

18Merton, Social TheorY and Social Structure p. 494. Mannhe
Ideologz !!!..9. UtopIa, p ,270. 19Maquet,

!!!!.

Soci.1081 .2! KIlow1ed§e, pp.

1~14.
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Mannheimts re1ationism is a camouflaged relativism but this ls
so beoause he does not distinguish too well between the sooial
and the 10g10a1 faotors in thought.

Soientifio and phi10sophios.

work is limited in scope and interest by sooial factor., and
even tends to accept with more ease this or that truth, but thl.
does not mean that the desire for truth and valid knowledge is
a pure myth.

As sociologists, it is enough to know that some

correlations can be established between thought and socio-cultural tacts, and unless we find a one-to-one correspondenoe we
cannot say that the sociology of knowledge is the onlyeXplanation of truth and falsity.

As a matter of fact, Mannheim him-

')utlf lett out the problem of true or ralse ideologies.

!!!!

second element

Basis,

2.! .2

Sooioloil

2!

Knowledge:

!!!!. Ext.tentia

The seoond element is the existentia basis.

eocio-cultural phenomena is thought related?

To Wbat

The differano •• of

solution to this question seem to be as wide as the sociologists
of kowledge.

Mannheim, in all the pages he devotes to the pro-

blem of the bases of knowledge, does not state clearly just what
he means by his group-determinism.

However, his studies about

the influences of politio.1 groups with regards to their olasses
and ideologies, seems to ofrer a vague answer to the question
asked before.
Merton alao noticed this tact. 20 A more concrete answer 1s
glven--it seeas to me--by Znanieoki. but hls work does not 01'2~annheim.'1
.. J:lu ........

J

... ~ .. v

analysis is limited, as well, by his failure tc

"'~............" .............................

v .......u ..........

"''''''''''''A ... """" ..................... "'''' .................. d

!mowledge,"' Me'FCon, 'So'CIal Theory and Social structure, p. 498.
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fer any explicit statement with

rega~.

sociology of knowledge in general.

The

to the methodologJ of the
c~tegories,

audience, pub-

blic, etc., as Merton says, could be taken as an attempt to discrimin~te

some of the irrelevant social facts in rel_tioD to mow-

ledge. 2l Sorokln has give. more importance to the cultural determinants of thought. 22
Ortega's.

We Will see that his approaeh is closer to

Merton claims that Sorokints oorrelation between

stems of truth

and

-.r-

partioular soientific and philosophical trends

of thought of one epooh, is' a tautology.2,

Maquet answers this

objection as follows:
In certain senxe the establishment by the tacts of a meaning
tul relationship may always be said tautological ••• aut then we
must admit that only the discoveries ot inexplicable relationship
(tm regard to the present state of the theoretical elaboration of

a~olence) are not tautological.24
Perhaps ortega offers a more conorete answer to this objeotion of Merton.

As we will see in the following pages, Ortega

proposes a basic ideologtcal preepeotive or sensibility of lite

2l Ibid .,p. 482.'

--- - ---- ......._--!!!!
2.!

22sorokin, Sooia1 and Cultural Dynamics,III (New York,l9'7).
2'Merton, Sooial Theory and Social struoture, p. 497.
24Maquet,

soojdogy

Knowledge, p. 196.
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of one epoch--the bellef-ay.'em of Sorokln Is thus more

soclologl~

cal In nature--as related to partlcular manlfestatlons of art,
polltical systems, and soclal aotion of a determlnate age.

!!!!.

thlrd element: Relation bet",'een thoUght-Erooesses

b,s.~1

~

social

The type of relatlon that exists between the existential

baais and thought-products can go from an exaggerated reallsm (as
It would be the theory of a univeraal mlnd that crellte' the oultural systems of truth) to the moderate positlon stating the mutual influence of thought and culture upon one another and bypass
ing other factors without denylng them.
,

It is luffiolent that we can establish certain relatlon be,
tween these two ~~riables, social facts and knowledge, in order
to justify a scientific

trea~ent.

Maquet chooses the relation

of "causal conditlon."
Necessary: when the constellation of sooial ciroumstanoes by which we define a fasci st group does not
ext-it, the Ina'rtlculate conception of history never
appear.
~. deflnition, the necessary and sufficient condition 1s the olro\mlstance in the absenoe of which a
faot oannot take place and whose presence always enta:la a fact.25

Another question is that which is conoerned ":t'l..;
eotion of the relation between the two variables.
dependent and which the independent variable?

"'~e

dir-

Which the

Tlll the

p~esent,

time, the SOCiologists of knowledge have been almost exclusively
'interested In one direction: that whieh treats knowledge as a de-
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pendent variable and the social basis as an independent variable.
BUt the inverse direction of the relation, if it could

b~

estab-

lished, would also fall within the limits of the sociology of kno.
ledge.

Ortegats treatment of beliefs and ideas offer an analysis

of the functional oharacter of thought and ideologies, so that
thought 1s treated as an independent varl.ble.

He has studied

the influence of soience, art, and philosophy upon the march and
dynamiCS of

socle~.

orteS!s Soclologr

£!

Knowledge.

~

usase

~

belief.

In the

chapter about t·he social faots, we disoussed the appearanoe and
nature of usages in a general way.

Expanding

the notion

s,~ewhat

of usages, we discover that they represent attitudes wnich in turn
represent opinions.

These social opinions

ref5~

to thet. things a.

round us, to sooiety, _to our relation 'it th other peop1d and the
~

world.

They constitute what we may call beliefs and t~ey ar. our

interpretation; of life.
vvhen we dicover ourselves

as

existing in this world, we find

ourselvea not only with things, but with people, not only in the
world, but in society; and these people and that sooiety we hapen to live in, already have an interpre-tation of lite, a oomplex
of ideas about the universe. 26
What is the social fUnction of these belief-systems?

Let us

remember that the usage is something impersonal and irresponsible.
The individual r1seF up as an opponent of the

26

usa~.s

and there£ore

of sooiety.

The way in whioh the individual oonstitutes himself

as individual is by
(ensimiamandose).

thi~king,

by retiring to his own solitude

But in order to think by ourselves, we must

depart from certain premises and unquestionable s truths.

We must

staDt from the known in order to arrive at the unknown.

What hap-

pen to an savage that enters a modern faotory in order to learn
how to wOl"k'

It a man of our oulture takes on the same work, we

will presuppose that he has a oompi1ation of oommon sense knowledge upon whioh we can
machines with which he

~

never seen a machine in

bu~ld

an explanation about the tools and

supposed to work.
h~

becomes almost impossible.

life.
··lie

But the savage has

Our work of instructing him

do not know where to begin

It

only

<

when something has been thought out, falls under our possession,
and on1y'when the elementary things are submitted to us, oan we
go on to more diffiou1t things. n27

Men have to make oontinual1y

important deciSions, not only of an individual, but also of a sooia1 character.

Thought is instrumental, acoording to Ortega, and

is SUbmitted to aotion and life.

We cannot ohoose irrationally

and therefore the' inf1ni tEl possibilities for aotion must be previously limited and seleoted.

\~'ho

ma.kes this se1eotion for us,

A sooia1 context of valu &s and norms; the weltanschauung of our
I,

27 Ortega, nMedltaoiones del
(Madrid, 1953), 353.

!~uljote,"

Obras Completas, I
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age and oulture.

This is a system of truth

social and politioal decisions as well.

th~t

enables us for

Before soienoe has de-

veloped in many areas, we must act and make political and social

.

moves.

~.

This 8,Jstem of ballets is,

accordin~

to Ortega, oulture

Itself.
Oulture, rigorously speaking is the system of ultimate
oonviotions about li£e. Culture is what one believes
"fiith unobjectionable .faith; a.bout the world •••
The totality of those convictions or 'ideas' is not
marlufactured fictiiona,lly by the individual, but he
reoetves them from his histo:r:-l.::al mili<;u.. 2 8
ortega oalls this belier-systme ~e sooial do~a.~8

The

social dogma offers to the ind\vidual a fpoint of departure for
his oreative think1ng.3 0
Belief-~yst.m:
.....
____
~

- _

l

Charaoteristios of the

To live ia to have to takEt care of something--the world
and oneselt.

But this

man is oanfronted,

wo~ld and

alread~

this 'self' with which

appear to him as organized

under an ideologioal 1nte~retatioD about the world and
himself. 11

~,

,~

The first charaoteristio (bout
sooial dogma
l,

~s

that we do

~

not think about them but deparuing
from them.
I

Beliefs are &0-

!

oepted as something that belon;s to a kind of rel~gio~8 faith.

aeOrtega, Obras Completa.s, II; (Madrid. 1954), p. 723, and
IV, 34~.
2~

Ortega,Obras Completas, VI (_adrid,

30 Ibid., II, 723.

31ibid., II, 342.

1956), 9.
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According to Ortega, this division between ideas in general and
sooial faith or sooial beliefs is more primordial than the division between religious faith and mow-ledge in general.

Within

the context of a general belief, a nation, an organization, and
finally, an individUal will be forved to see some realities to
which he is more inclined and to be blind to other realltiea.
This is what Ortega calls the doctrll1e

2!

~

Eolnt

.2.!

view.

The psychic structure of each individual results in a
per8eptive organism, gifted with a determinate form
that permits him to understand ::lene truths and blinds
him with regards to' some other truths.32
The function of this social point of view that beliefs creat
is similar to the role of 'the myths and tal~s during childhood.
In a study that Ortega wrote about the education of children,
"fe.c~s

provoke sentiments in .us •. What would happen not

o1l1~" ~

child, but to a man', the most intelligent man in the world, if
suddenly all theefficatious myths were taken away from his soul
Things awaken in us a twofold re-action qf history and legend.
\'Vhat rules our lives is not so much things, as wha t we intend to
60 with them.

way_

.A.nd this goal of ours is an ideal, .ct legend in a

The sportman has only a realistic grasp of those realities

32ortega, "Ideas y creenciaa," Ibid .. , V (Madrid,

1955),

384.

;;. .tega, flBl 'QUljote t en 1&:' escuel.. ,,,,, IbId., II, (.adrid.

1953), 296.

9'
that are not oonneoted with sports.
psychological hormone." ~

"Myth, says Ortega, is the

'}!Jhen we find someone who is not inter-

ested in anything and we try to injeot in him some new interests
so that he can live again, we do not tell

hi~

about things and

facta--he probably knows as many things as we do--but about po.s.
ible reactions
lYe

and

experienoes to which he is closed psychologioal

"What we are interested in, is that things be beautiful,"

says ortega. 35

And ~1 another place he says: "Life, before being
I

an ada,tAtion of man to his environment, i8 a reception of this

environment by man, who needs in some way to feel it. n 36 This
feeling depends on the perspective of an age.

The belief system

of a determinate cultural period is called by Ortega, the sensibility of lite. Ortega calls it also the

~irit

of the time.

"At

all moments, men live in a world of convictions, the greateat number of which are oonvictions
same age.

co~~on

to all

peo~le

who live in the

These conv1btlons constitute the spirit of the time. n '7

"Any lite,n says Ortega, "willingly or unwillingl,., needs to justiry itself."38

34I b1d ••

p.

35Ibid., p.

Not only the individual must find an answer to the

297.
289.

36Ibid.
37ortega, ItLa historia como sistema," Ibid., VI (MadrId,1956>.

38 Ortega, "En tomo a Galileo," IbId., V (1955), 25.

riddle of life, but also society.
answer to this riddle.

The spirit of the time is the

It consists in

8

general attitude on the

basis of whioh existence appoars in a determinate way.

Things are

perceived and interpreted according to their consistency with regards to this spirit of the time.

Social, political and economio

problems are looked from the same viewpoint.
Origin
the

~

Change or belief-systems:

t~ansmission

ifbat is the mechanism of

and alteration of these beliefs? The belief sy-

stem is nothing else than the general structure of all usages,
their consistence and orgebization.

However, when usages change,

the systems of belie' can remain •. Sather it is modified progressively, until the moment comes When the old structure 1s no longe
compatible with the existing usages.
Belief systems give us the sensibility of the epoch,
and are not transmitted to us directly. Rather they
are implicit in configurations of usages

~nich

are

, transmitted to un directly.39
Dirference between beliefs and ideas:

The main characteristic

of belief-systems is their latent function.

They are "everything

that we take for granted, and that, as a result, we do not even
think of .,,40

Beliefs a.re opposed to idea.s.

fabrica.ted in an explicit way_

Ideas are a1".,9oY8

They constitute scienoe, liber.-

39Ibid.

4°Ortega. "Ideas y oreencias, Obr!s Completas, V (1955) ;87.
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ture, and many other forme of
used.

O~a1

or written speeoh arbitrarlly

Ideas only exist when we are thinking a bout them,· whereas

beliets constltute our way of looking at 11fe.
exist when they are·thought." says ortega.41

nTheox-ies on17
From this he con-

cludes: "Therefore they exist, in a way, founded on our will. n42
Ortega does not speak a\ any time about the validity ot ideas or

bel,.r. Be

is only interested in their psychological and social

function.

It is true that beliets otfer a great chanoe ot being

talse, beoause of our unoritioal

acoept~oe

of them.

SO tar as

ideas are ooncerned, their truthfulness depends on their objeotivity, which in turn, depends on the oonslateno}' ot one idea
with all other ideas, and tin ally on the'oonsistenoy of this
Whole scheme 'ot ideas with the

beliet-system.

Ideas require a critical attitude, just as the lungs

need oxygen.

They are susta1ned

and

reaftirmed in

other ideas, which, on their turn, are sustained 10
other ideas, constItuting a whole system.

ao that the

firmness of an, idea is reduoed to the soll'1tr that
holds it and reters .it to all othera. n43

42<>rtega,

43 0rtega,

"Ideas y creenias," Ibid., V (1955), ,89.

9(;

Man orientate. hi.selt through his age, througbt the sociocultural bellel.system. in whl.eh he finds himself.

'!'t.1 s. and not

any consideration about a soclal appetite. 1. what makes man soo-

ial and cultural at the same time.

"AccordiD.il:.to Ortega, there

are protound rea80Da that ellplaln the 800ia1 struoture ot human
beings, these reaSODS are based on the fact tha.t a beliet cannot
exist

un~er

the form ot belief of an individual or group," says

Ferrater Mora. 44
The way in whioh beliets are borwn and develop 1.8 the same
way in which culture and usages appear and ohange,

Li'tle by 1itt18, scienoe, eithios, art. religious
faiths, a juridioial norms get loose from the subject who oreated them and aquire a consistency and

an authorIty by them.e1ves.45
I!portance

!!

Ortegats SOoio10§l

~

Knowledge.

a striot determinism with regard to belie'.,

Q!tega professes
They are for htm

the m.1n basil ot aocia1 life, and it is on aocount of them that
one oan predict historioal and aoolal phenomena:
.~~

The idea that all things influenoo one another and
tha t ea41;J.. . thlng depend. on eve17thlng el.e i8'
"'
va..... W.tioal thought whioh is repugn8.1lt to anyone

who likes to aee things •• they are. No. the bo~
ot h1storical tacts possess6s a consistency and ~
del' pertectly b1er.u~ohlcal. ThU8 the mere transfor-

44F3rr~ter Mora, La tilolOtla de Ortega T Ga••et (Buenos Ai.e
'
45ortega, Obras C~leta8, III -(1954), 146.

1958). Ih 78.
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matioD of an industJ"ial or political order is hard17 profound, and depends on ideas and moral and e.thetical preterences that mirror the contemporary
scene. But Ideology, taste, and moralIty are nothIng
more than t~Lspeclfic result of the radical sensibility of life.4 o
'
Ideas as artiticial bell.t.:
..............
;;.

"

The basic

ditrer~tno.

between belief •

and idea. is explol'8d:

About bellers I "it 1s possible to say

that they are not ideas

W~

have, but

i~eas

we

a~.

More than that

precisely because they are most radical beliet., they are identltied with reality itselt ••• they 10 •• , therefore, their cbaraoter

ot ideas, of thoughts ot someone.

"47

Ideas on the oontrarf,

"al'e our own products, and ,therefo", they presuppose our exist.
ence which is grounded on beliefs. 1148

Ortega oontinues: ttWhat

we cannot do is to live by them,"49 namely, in the same way 1n
which we live by a beliet.

sinoe ideas are irrelevant to our 11t.

the prooess by Which we create them, namsly thinking, is a supraactivity, a sort .f !port. This is the basio differenoe between
thinking and believing.

~~

build ideas, says Ortega, preoise17

because we do not believe in them.

Beliefs are intimately oon-

neoted wi th llf. J ideas with adventure. sport, ete..

And this 1s

a speoial case of the general theory about the function ot the
intelleot in li.fe.

470rtega, "Ideas '1 creenolas," Obraa Comp1etaa, (Madrid, 1956t

p.

3aibld.
4.9Ibld.
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The intellectual life is secondary with respect to
our real autb.enjjlc life, and represents only

I.

vir-

tual or imaginery dimeusion of our lives. 50
This way of speaking or Ortega--so it seems--is opposed to
every modern interpretation of science, especially of the social
scienoes.

We OJ not practice sociology for the sport of it.

Much

less do we engage in practical social activities for pure fun.
Since the tirne of Comte, sociologists are believed to have an impoetant role in our age of change and confusion.

From the know-

ledge of the moral sciences, man today expects to resolve his
problema and prepare a better world for the future.

tmat is the

answer of Ortega to those objeotions?
Social function of ideologies:

science~ literature,~.

Scienoe.

he would say, explains everything except what makes us believe in
it.

In the last instance, we will see that what makes us do

80

1.

not put into question because it is something that usuallybeltng.
to the general feelings of our generation.

In the Middle Age.,

religious faith was believed to be the great weapon to solve sooial and pol! tioal problems,

Tha. t if! 'N hy science was enolosed wi tb

in the walls of the monasteries and had no influence on public

life.

Today we expect everything from acience.

This dose!

2!

rea so:n , Ortega points out, began with socrates and reached its
cl1max :wi th DEmartes," Among the bali.,. that present men have.

the bellet in 'reason' 1s still one of the ~ost
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impobtant. w51

The taot that impresses Ortega, Is that sclence, 11ke philosoph7.
does not justify it. foundatlon, whatbrlngs us to phllosophiz.
or to scientific research?
Sclence cannot only be a science of society, but it
pretends to be also a. Boience of man.

Now what has

seienoe or reason to say with precision about this
tact so urgent and so pertinent to it, namely, its
value and importance.

Well, nothing.

Science does

not know anything clear about this point.5 2

-y

Orteg~

Gasset is talking here about the natural sclenoes.

Oan we apply the same ideas to the social sciences?

Ortega say.

that the social sciences are intimately connected with the natura1."ln Comte as well as In stuart Mill, everything depends on the
Immut"bliity of the laws of nature. u 53

That Ortega aooepts1hls

positIon of Comte and Mill. is easy to deduce from paragraphs lIke
the following, where he treats common opinion: "For we are not.
dealing with an opinion based on faots more of les8 frequent and
probable, but on a law of :lol}i.al tphysiCs' muohmore immovable
than the l"ws of Newton' s physics." 51....

The dogma of reason is

;lIbid., p. '90.
;2ortegat Obras Completas, v~ (1956), 21.
5'Ibid ... p.29
54 Ortega, The Revolt

£!

~ Masses l p. 127.
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neve~

analyze in detail by Ortega.

the very logioal nature

and

He gives it as a ract.

So

objeotivity of thought, seems to be

made de?endent on sooio-oultural tactors:
It has been held, that thinking is principally logical thinking, in othe~ words,thinklng according to
determinate laws that logicians have oalled tprinciples.' But 10g1cal think1ng--as we have,":sa1d.-ia
only one of the multiple forms of thought and a ver,r
restricted one. It the limitations of loCtOAl thought
have not been dleoovered before, it is because philosophers have had an unlimited trust in a unilateral type
of logioal thinking.55

And this trust .. we may add, 1s a belief acoording to Ortega.
Belief chanS!

~

sooial inestabiittl

The second step in the

e~

planation of beliefs and ideas, is th&ir formation and ohange into

one another.

This section of Ortega's sociolog7 of knowledge cor-

responds in a way to the modern oategories of oultural change and
cultural lag.

Beltets certainly change.

Today, Ortega writes,

the Europeans have lost thei:- faith in science and they start

doubting the role

01'

l'eason in lite.56

The moment when man or

society asks about the validity of a social belief, 1s the moment

ot doubt."

In the elementary

g~ound

of doubt open up here and there. 1t57

p.

550r tega, "Ideas
406.

of our beliets, enormous gaps
Ortega continues:

"One doul1B

y oreen1as," Obras Completas (Madrid,1955),

56Ferrater Mora, L~ f11080f1& ~ Orts!! Z Gaa8et p. 85.

;7or tega,

1955), ;88.

ftldeas 7 creenias," ?braa Compl~taa, V (Madrid,
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beoause one is plaoed between two oontradiotory beliefs that bump
into eaoh other, pulling aside the ground on which we rest."58
Notioe the great differenoe that exists between this doubt as
desoribed by Ortega, and the doubt. that oome up when we are
manipulating ideas.

Whil. on the intelleotual level the doubt

does not affeot us; in the area of beliefs, the same doubt lea.es
us in the air and robs our lives of something that has to be repaired.

The ultimate

re~son

for the importanoe of doubts in this

area is that we believe in them.
antagont.tic

Or rather we 'believe in the two

beliefs that the doubt tries to reoonoile.

Do not take this as a pure paradox, but I oonsider very diftj.ct!lt to e xpre ss what a real doubt i,8 wi. thout sa.ying that

we believe in it.

that were not so, if we doubted about our doubt, it would not be a doubt at all. 59
I~

Our whole lite seems to crumble because beliefs are the general possibilities of courses of action, of vital expansion.

The

doubt, like the belief, can begin in the individual, but it doe.
not oonstitute a menaoe until it is incorporated into sotiety.

A

period of 10*1a1 doubt 1. a peridd ot change of culture and perspeotive of
such a case?

l~f'i.

How does the individual or

Man devotes himself to thinking.

58Ibid ., p. 392.
au

59Ibid., p. 394.

socl~t7

react in

And such thinking
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is no longer a sport, but an aotivity which oonstitutes a matter
of lite or death.

Finally, man constructs an idea, an artifioal

beliet, and sooiety progressively forgets about the way this idea was attained and about its logioal basis.

The artificial be-

lief or idea is transformed into a social dogma.
Then we have no other way out but building a new idea
or opinion about things, t he things we are loubttng about.

Ideas are, in this case, the objects we consoi.

ously build and elaborate precisely becau3e we do not
believe in them. 60

From this thinking, man return. to

the reality that has been stolen from

h~.

and now he

has recuperated.
From his ensimismamlento man oomes ba.k to realit,. to the
reality that he sees now as through an optlQl devioe, with his
interior world of ideas, some of which are transformed and consolidated in beliefs. 6l
Not all the ideas are trlllsformed into beliefs.

In order

tor an idea to become beliet, it has to be revealed--this is the
Ortegian expression--to society.

The idea beoomes a ne. faith

that i. aocepted without argument.
There is revelation whenever man come. into oontact

-

60 Ibid ., p.

-

'9'.

6lIb1d ., p. '91.
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with a nww reality different from him, and it does not
make too much difference what type of reality illi sis,
if it appears to us as sheer reality and not as a cav-'
illion or imagination of ours. 62
D1ffer~nce

between usages

~

beliefs:

Up to this point we have

establiShed a perfect parallel between usages and beliets.

How-

ever, beliefs, as we stressed at the beginning of this chapter.
are implicit in the ue.ges.

Usages and beliefs

originst~

same way, but not every usage implies a new beliet.
manifestations of beliefs,
with them.

The change

o~

~nd

in the

UBat~es

are

can be at times lrreconciable

beliefs always constitutes a change of

cultube and weltansohauung.
"The individual," says Ortega,
in the universe through his raoe.
a

drop of water in

III

ttCaD

only orientate himselt

For he is immersed in it like

wondering oloud."63

Ortega tend. to dis-

cover the historical epo8bs not so much in their factuality, as
in their meaning.

To grasp the latter, one must look at the

facts in their historical perspective or style of life.
tend to forget,"

"We

Orte[<a says, "that each race is an experience

of a definite type of life, of a new sensibility.,,64

62 r bid •. 1 p. 4.01.

630rtega, Obras COmpletas, VI (Madrid, 1956),
64Ibid., p. 61.
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beoomes in the hands of Ortega the verifioatioh of his theory
of beliefs and ideas.

As men evolve, their historioal set changes

and as a consequenoe he changes too.

"When the living being e-

volves, his environment and especially the perspective of things
around him, change with htm. n65
Historicism

~

ortega:

Ortega has many different essays about

almost any period of European history.

Some of his general oon-

olusions have already been explained,

like'his soo1010gy of war

deduced from the idea of the knight and from dIfferent historioal
dootrines like paoifism, direot action, eto..

Time does not allow

us to study in detail all these essays of Ortega.
We do not pretend to consider these studies as a mere sociological to:.'! •• AD ... matter of fact, ortega oonsidered histCll"7 as
a metaphysioal explanation during a great period of his life.
Furthermore, bis dialogue with Momsen, Spengler. and other great
historians, place him in the field of
point of our work we only want to

histo~

itself.

At this

enumerate the baois original

ideas more clOsely connected with the sooiology of knowledge,
One of these questions is the following: "Without any doubt,
the

great~st

questiOI:kt.o.:'be

asked by historians today aOlmds like

~)ortesa, Obras COmp1etas, I (Madrid, 1953), 362.
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this: Vfuo is the real subject of history?n66
Ortega gives the a.nswer:

A few pages later

ttThe real historical subject a.re cul-

tures not races or people. 1167

Ortega's answer to the :same ques-

tion had been, a few years earlier, different.
generations as the real subjects of history.

He considered the
However, when he

defines it, there seems to be no boticeable difference between
generation and

c~lture.

Co~~union

in time and in spaoe are the main cha»acter-

istios of

Ii

generation.

The.s two things together mean

the communion in a general destiny.68
A generalion not a group of illustrious men, nor simply
a mob.

It is like

8.

new socIal body completed with its

selected minority and its multitude which has been sent
into eXistence. 69
The connection of all this discussion about the subject of
history with sociology can be seen from the next paragra.ph: "Each
genera.tion represents a vital attitude from which existenoe is
felt in a particular way."70

66Ibid., III (1954), 192.

67 Ortega, Obras Completa.s,

I I I (Madrid,

68Ibid· e
69ibid., V, (1955) p. 39, III, p.

70Ib~.d.,
148 •
...

-

147.

1954.), p. 298.
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In other words. the imyortnnt factor in deterulining what a
generation is. is the social dogma.

But this corresponds. says

Ortega, with the communion in space-time.

The secondpoint to be

noticed is the aristooratic conception of society that has with
its minority-majority relation determines the creation and evolution of the weltansohauung or perspective of life.

The very his-

torioal changes are ohanges ln belief-systems, according to this
theory.

Hlstory, for Ortega, ohanges not beoause the facts are

different, but beoause the interpretation that men give to the
same or different facts evolves.

Ortega dlffers fram the histori-

cal theories of Spengler mld Froenius about the importanoe of the
generation for he looks at the generation as an open system that
evolves aocording to the laws of change of social beliefs.
culture, he says, not the peoples, make history.7 l

The

And ln another

place he says:
When the modifioation that the world Buffers does not
affect what I believe to be its main constitutive elements, the general profile of this world remalns intaot.
Man does not have the impression that the world haa ,_
changed, but only that something has changed ln the
world. 72

7lortega, Obras Completas, Ibld., (Madrld,
72Ibld., V

(1955), 35.

1954) 300.
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The important factor about this generation is that they
ahould not be considered as suoceeding one another- (costaneaa)
but as living together in the same historical scenery
Formeaa).

(conte~

The today. Ortega oontinue., signifies th1'ee differ-

ent things, one to the young people, another to the adults and
another to the old people.

Who preoisely, aska Ortega, i8 the

real subject of h:i.storioal change?
Children and old people hardly play a signifioant role
in history, the former by defect, the latter by excess.
lut men in their first years of youth do not have any
positive contribution in history whether, for the historical role of this age is passive: it consists in
learning in the sohools and military servioe. 73
Ortega descends to suoh details that he appears at timea influenced by the common way of

t~inking

of the first sooiolgista

as expressed in the three stages of Comte, or the Darwinian peri0 ••

of spencer.

tween the ages

History, he says, is carried out by people beof

~O

and 60

ye~P8.

So far as the historical cy-

oles of a culture, its birth and death oan be determined once we
know the ages of the subjeots of history.

Ortega ends up in with

almost mathematical way of determining oultural ohanges, and he
trie. to verity his methodology by plaoing people like Descartes,
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Galileo, and many others at the top of cultural changes.

The

cultural shifts take place every fift.en years more or les••
These cultural shifts result in rztbmea or historical Tie.s.
Ortega analyzes these rythmes with regards to the outlook of
dirferent periods
kind.

abo~t

s.x, age, buying, and things of this

Some of these studies, like

"Mascu~ino 0

-Le. escaparates mandan,

"or

femenino" offer very little subject-matter for the

soci.logist and anthropologist and place him more in the realm
of literature than science.

To a great degree, these studies

ofter a similarity with Spencer's cultural descriptions and observations.

748ee La rebelion de las mas•• (Madrid, 1958), pp. 189-193,
200... 208.
- -

CHAPTER V
THE SOCIOLOGY OF

~

OF ORTEGA

The soope and orientation of this tentative field of sociology is desoribed in these words by Barnett:
as

In some respeots this field oan best be desoribed
as a point of view or attitude toward art, rather
than as a reoognized area of study encompassing a
speoific subject matter, employing aooepted methods
of investigation, and seoure in its possession of an
establishes frame of referenoe. On the whole, the
sooiologist who stUdies art is not yet olearly diff~
erentiated, in term. of soholarly funotion, fram the
social historian, the art historian, or the art oritio.l
The sooiology of art, like the ,sociology of knowledge, is a

modification of the general history of ideas-win our

o~se

history

of art--inasmuoh as it uses a soientifio methodology and restriots
its interest to art as influenoed by socio-cultural phenomena.
The seneral thee's of the sooiology of art is that art refleots
the nature of oultural interaotion, cultural ohange, and social
norms of sooiety.

The 80Qiologioal approach to art is almost as

old as art itself, but has taken ,on a new dimension in the works
of Hegel and Colingwood.

Hegel's volgheist or spiritual prinoip-

IJames H. Barnett, "The 80cio1037 of Art," Sociology Today
(New York. 1959). p. 198.

""l
•.
I> I

-..,.'

.~

./

I
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le of

Ii

culture reflected in its art forms, has also been dis-

cussed by men like Comte, Spencer, Toynbee.

These dissussions

were scientific theories and not mere common sense considerationsl
however, they are still very far from the goal of scientifio verification.

~ith

the philosophical ground provided

by men like

Hegel, Dilthey, Marx, and with the methodological tools of Weber,
Durkheim, ana others, who studied art as part of the sociology of
religion and eulture, the sociology of art can today stand on its
own feet as an independent field.

Currently the field of symbol-

ic expression and art have been treated extensively by some writers: Cassirer, Langer, Levy-Bruhl, and sociologists like Simmel
and 1!'ach. 2 Cultural anthropologists have also done a great deal
of research in this area.

Malinowski, for instance, considered

myth as a revelation of the sooia1 character within his funotional approach.

Mead has applied some of the basic insights of

Freud to symboli0 forms.'

The general contribution of these

writers about symbolism to sooiology can be best summari,ed in
these words of Albrsoht: "Toynbee finds that art styles more ac-

2augh Duncan, "Sociology of Art, Literature and MUsio: Sool ...
a1 Contexts of symbolic Experience," in Modem Sociological Theory, ed. by Becker and Bosko!! (New York, 1951), p. 482.

'''For Mead, the social was a category in its own right, to
be explained by the socIal aspects of the role-taking in communication, rather than by analogy to physical nature, bio1ogioal envircnment, or the sUbstantation of Spirit, Goc, or Society." IbId
p.

483.
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curately

establlab~

, the sp"n of a 01vl11aatlon, it s growth and

dissolution, than any other method of measurement. n 4
Literature reflects the socio-cultural milieu and exeroises
R

great influence and social control over the social attitudes

and behavior.
duct as well

Studies 1n this area" tend to treat art as a pro,"S

a determinant of socla.l structU!te.

logists tend to emphasize more empirically

relev~t

Other socioaspeota, suoh

as the inst i tutionalization of art in different sooieties.

They

otter a general theory tor suoh researoh areas as the influenoe
I

of group-affiliation and artistio oreativity, the, sooial status
and role of the artists, public and oritio, and their mutual interaotion.5

But the 800iologioal approaoh to art whioh is more

relevant for our treatment of Ortega is that founded on the sooioMarx waa also the first Who treated art as a

logy of knowledge.

mirror of the economio struoture of SOCiety,

Of cou»se, here, as

before, we must stress the philosophioal commitment of Marx without whieh his sociologioal vie. are nothing but indioations tor
future research.

"Marx argued that even art preferenoes dll'.ter

acoording to class position and outlook. n 6

,4Albrecht, Milton" "The Relationship of Literature and Sooi.
!!.:.l.. 2!.. soo., VI, (1959), 427.

ety,"

5Bamett, nThe Sooiology of Art,1t p. 408.

6Ib1d., p. 200.
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For Sorokin, art is one of the dependent
three systems of truth. 7

vari~b1es

of the

Mannheimt. oentra1 thesis, namely, that

"there are modes of thought whioh oannot be adequately understood
as long as their sooia1 origins are ebscured," is espeoia11y relevant to the social study of art.

Art is a type of knowledge

closer to the qualitative than to the exact sciences, according
to Mannhetm.

The relation of the latter to social groups and

epoohs is somewhat obscure in Mannheim, but the relation of the
former to the same groups is more definite.

And among the exam-

ples Mannheim has given of the qualitative SCiences, many refer
to art.
Just as in art we oan date particular forms on ground
of their definite association with a particular period
of history so in

~;

case of knowledge we can detect

with increasing exaotness the perspeotive due to a particular historioal setting. 8
And in another chapter he say81
This prooess of the oomplete destruction of all spiritual elements, the utopian as well as the

ideological, has

its parallel in the most resent trends of modern life,

7Ibld., p. 205.
8Mannheim, Ideology ~ Utopia, p.271.
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and in their corresponding tendencies in the realm
of art.')
still there is a reluctance in Marmheim, to treat a.rt a.s
defini to type of' human knowledge, like science.

Ill.

Thi S pI'oblem doe

not exist for Ortega, who identified the. sociological origin of

art with that of scienoe.
As in the case of ti:'.i.e general sociology of knowlledge, we canrlot avoid preliminary considerations about thought-interpretation
so here we must engage in interpretations of art wl1ich are beyond
the Bcope of the sociologist.

Not only the general nature

01"

art

i'oni'ls must be studied and defined, but particular interpretation.

are to be manipulated in order to relate them in an adequate manner to the general weltanschauung of a cultural age. lO
The central work of the sociology of' art in Oriaga is constt-

--- ---------------

tutad by his essay: 'rhe Dehumanization of Art and at few remarks
of his Ideas and Bellefs.

Ortega approves full heartedly the

possibility of a sociological apPI'oach to art.

1\

Among the mul-

tiple ideas of the French genius Guyau, his attempt to study art

9

Ibtd._ p.

256.

lOAlbrecht, pp.

426-27.

lJl~

from a sociologica.l point of view must be considered. nll

As a

matter of fact, Ortega. confes,ses that this is the only genial idea
of Guyau since of his sociologic6Il interpretation of art: "only
the title exists; the rest of the work has yet to be ':rritten."l2
For the Spanish SOCiologist, art, together with science, 1s the
w,ain manifesta.tion of the change of the sensibility of an epoch.
The reason is that art ru}d science constitute this realm of hu-

man activity which is more independent of sooial taboos and nor.ms.
That is why when a oultural ohange starts developing, its blueprint oan

be

found in art and science.

Art appreoiation and art

response becomes, in this context, a typical oase of what we describe before as exemplarity.

The artists are sooial leaders.

Art is not only a by-product of imagination in general, but of a
definite type of imagination: that by whioh men plan their lives
and control their social and po1itica1 environmaat.

Art 1s the

first message of this change of attitude and choioe-patterns of
a culture.

According to Ortega, the way in which art has to be

approached by the SOCiologist is not

wi~h

attitude but by a sympathetic observation.

an undetaohed analytica

Of all the

~roduot.

of human knowledge, art is the one that requires more preparation
on the side of the scientist.

This general methodological ques-

llortega, n La de shumanizaoion del arte, n Obrae Compl etas, III
(Madrid, 1955), 353.

-

12 Ib1 ••
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tion

creates many difficulties.

To what degree is it possible

to have objective outlook to empirical researoh when art-interpretation is a conditio

~

qua !!2!!. of posterior .ooiological

considerations? "Why", Ortega asks, tlis the point of view of the
indifferent and not of the lover corisidered as decisive?"13

Ex-

&mining the case of the man who falls in love, he oontinues:
It

I will only say that, according to my judgment. i.we analyze

the phenomenon of this sublime feeling of love, it w1ll be found
very soon that love oannot see beoause it. function 1. not to
seo••• The normaa fact i. that the

l~ver

of an objeot or of a be-

ing has a more exaot vision than the indif.ferent. n14

Art is a

manifestation 01 the vital attitude or a oulture, of its over-all
reaotion to the historical surroundings.

If interpretation of

oulture require a minimum of partioipant behavior, how:much more
will it be neoessarr to have partioipant behavior wben the question is a bout the implioit synthesis of a social epoch.

"only

men oan experience what is human," says Ortega paraphrasing
Goethe. 15 Man always aots in an artistic way.

He defends himself

from the weather with dresses and houses, etc., which never fulfl11 a mere material function.

On the contrary, they beoome ob-

jects of artistic and symbolic expression.

In a more

gene~al

130rtega, Obras Completas, III (Madrid, 1955),292.
14Ibid.
15Ibld,

way

we can S'8.y that it is impossible to understand any hUlnan action
materially oonsidered.
1s direoted.

'l,e must refer it to the context where it

To live is as muoh an ir.dividuat1 problem as a soo-

1al one, and all

at.~ltudellJ

and behavior of men reflect their soo-

ial environment which is .full of artistio behavior.
Every human gesture, is a gesture of mastery or of
slavery.

----

Tertim non datur.

This is the reason why

everyone decides this or that style an attitude in
life.

The servile gesture is servile because the man

who performs it does not exist founded on himself,
and lives, at all moments, by oomparing himself to
other people. 16
"Every generation," says Ortega, "Has .. definite vital attitude.,,17 Ortega divides the ages into ma.souline and feminine, aooording to the prevalence role given to one or other sex; into
young and old; into times of plenitude and poverty, and so on.
These different attitudes are usually discovered in art.

--...... _----

present attitude of the revolt of the masses is

~isoovered

so-oalled phenomenon of the dehuaanlzation of art.

The
in the

Following

very olosely this essay we can observe how the SOCiology of art
is manipulated in the hands of Ortega.

16ortega,

1!.

rebelion de las masas, p. 193.

17ortaga, Obras Completas! III p.

148.
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A striking sociologioal ••peot ot modern art, Ortega writes,
i. its unpopulariq.

Modern art is not
only oultivated but apf
i,

preolated by an elite which does not exeroi.e any inf1uenoe upon
the masses.

Any new .rtistie tendenoy, It 18 true, is unpopular

for a short period, until it 18 finally inoorporated into the rea
of the masses.

But today's unpopularity in art i. much more radi-

oal.
The disjunctive i. produoed in a deeper level than that
in which the varieties of individual taste funotion •••
To my judgment the charaoteristic note of modern art
tram a sociological viewpoint, i. that it divide. the
publio into two olasses of people, tho.e who understand
1 t and thosa who do not. 1S

There is a marked eftort on the side of the artist to make
art for its own sake. above, or, we could even aay, againat. the
response of the publio.

This

8ooiolo.&cal~

taot is partioularly

surprising--Ortega notioes--in an age when the masses have come to
the fore of history.

Nothing is more opposed to the. equality of

all men as modern art, .aY8 ortega. 19 The nineteenth century is
the age of great massive movements. :The crowd invades all the important place.

and

determines all oodes ot behavior.

lSortega, "La deshumaninzaoion del arte," p. 355.
19Ibid., p.356.
M

The art be.
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oomes popular as never before.
excellenoe.

Romantici8m is the popular art par

Its tendenoy to imitate nature and its themes of love I

suffering, hatred snd envy, etd., have a great appeal for all kindl
of publio.

Romantioism is sn instr1.lm.ental art, and all its values

are taken from the objeots it

s~Olize ••

,

During the 19th century the artists . .va prooeeded too
oarelessly.

They reduoed to a minimum the artistio ele-

ment.and made their art

eons~st

almost exclusively in a

fiotion about human realitie •• 20
The sorrowful fate of Tristan and Isolde only influences
those who donsider it a reality, or as a symbol of many po ••lble
similar stories.

In other words, the artists aim at a pure !mita-

tion and the artistio forms tend to di sappear and leave the audIence 1n contaot with reality.
Today there is an opposite tendency and art is sought after
for it s own .aka.

There is a compelling need to arrive at the

pure artistio form.
question.

\Vhether this is po.sible or not, is another
ttThe new art," says Ortega, "is an artistio art. tt2l

Ortega t s examples are taken from painting, musio and lIterature.
Through them he arrives at the following generalizationl "Eaoh
atyle that appears through history, oan engender a oertain number
of different fDrms within a generic type.

20Ib id., p. 358.

21IbIdl, p. 359.

But the day comes when
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the magnifioent source of forms is exhauated. n22
Modern art opens the door to infinite ne. possibilltes, because It 1. not an imitative art.

The forms of Imitation are,

therefore, as numerous as mants imagination.

Thi. artlatlo ex-

peasion of modern art, instead of being a pure crTstal, l"-1re in
t

Raaantloi8B. becomes the only point ot intere.t.
completely the signlfled objeot.
tor its own sake.

The sign repla_

This is what Ortega means by art

And the avoidance and positive deformation of

reality constltutes the dehumanization ot art. The Romantic art

----~------~----ls ea87 to evaluate because
It is ea.,. to partioipate in Its creatiODS.

It is an art that portrays the common experlence. ot lite,

In Whlch .e all are experts. Modern art, an the contrarr. retu.e.
this attltude totally and demans trom the audience an undetachet
spirit ot contemplation rather than'participatlon.

Ortega eata-

blishe. a .oale of art-appreciation:
In one extreme we

tla. an aspect of the world, periODS

and things that constitutes the experienced realitr. Ir1
the other we see everrthing under the aspect of cont••plated reallt,,23

The dehumanization ot modern art cODslsts in the artlst.s in22Ibld., p. 360.
23xbld., p. 362.
I
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teMst in the id.a in it.el1", not in the objeot.

Bowlt i. on

thielevel ot the Idea for it. own sake, where any vital and experienti ..l reaotion is suppr•••• d.

So thati the art doe. not be.
f
oome inhuman becau.e it represents inhuman elementa, but mainly

b.cause ita goal i. to dehumanize.

The important element there.

fore is not the terminus a guo, but the terminus
Orte..

~

quem, saye

The fact of today' a opposition to ROlUUltloia i8 nothing

surprising from. a meta-historioal viewpoint.

atlti$ymns of his-

tOl'J ~ aocording to Ortega, proceed by oP!"'ol,1 tic)Q.

'!'l'~I::'~~

i!ll

&lOll

ani«ll.Ul period ,of discov.1'7 and 1"•• years later, the8aturat.

':--.1£

p(.\~.;"t., "1Ib&~ th~

passlbill tie. of a typ. Cl1". art are exhausted.

Then people invent something different, somethiug which i. uaually

oppos.d to the old type of ar,t.

Howev.r, the signifioant and pe-

culiar aspeot of today's art, aocording to Ortega, ls that it is
going agaInst the past in general, so that the result il not an
attack on a definite type of art, but an art in general.

"Because

at the .nd, to attaok the art is to rebel against art itselt, for
.hat other thing is art it not what bas been done 1n the past,ft24
Art, acoording to ortega, Is

~bolic

by nature, and a pure ob-

jectlve or oontemplatlve attitude 1n art 1s impossible.
mistake is to oonfuse a mere
titud. of oontemplation.

obj~otlvistio

But the

with an undetaohed at-

There is laok of objectivity whenever

we reaot diaproportionately to same stimulus.

Tbe mau who wine
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a g.. at prize reaots disproportionately llfc . . does not teel anything, or 11 he teels too muoh.

so, ortega oonclude., "Under the

mask of a love tor art in its purity there hid••" • contempt aDd
hatred tor art.~25 And this oontempt is a mirror of a sooiologlcal attitude, "Hatred for art cannot- exiat without generatlng a
parallel hatre~ to.r the ",hole OU1,ural reality ot an age."2.6

This.

hatred tor OU1*Ml is the the retalt ot the .a8.e. agalf,18t all
Qul tural norm ••
Art together wi t-h soienoes belong to the ".-.1':11
logy of knowledge that Ortega called idea,. However
are., as we said betore, grounded on some belieta.

()~~ ~~e
a~
?

,ooio-

our ideas

Si~ce':rt and

'cience are also as we aaid before, more independent trom tabooa
than any other type ot inowledge, they are a atrong indication of
the new ohange in the sen.ibili t7 ot lite J ot the ne .. type ot beliet system.

Art; espeCiallY', has a strong 1nd1vidualist1c a.pec\

and aa such, reve.ls to us the ne .. type ot beliet-qate..s that substi tute tor and take the pla ce ot the old aoc1al dogma.
in the torms

Ortega,

ot modern art, envisage • • future time ..hen all norma

and oultural value. will be d1sm1saed by the mas.e., it soc1ety
doe. not d1scover again a "powerful minority" that lea4s 1t to
some definite

:o:~

-

1. "''"7
,:.. (

----

27artega,L& rebellon de las m&.&s, p. 180. '
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Art,

li~e

any idea, is the product of a super-activity, or

sport, Ortega would say,
relevant to our lite.

vbat we do in tnis area of ideas is ir-

Ha.wer, Ideas, in the long run, consolidate

into crede. and they become artificial beliefs, as we sald before.
The sociolo*loal conolusion then, is that an art for its ewn sake
Is never going to be transformed Into belief, sinoe art for Its
own sake is like an idea that is never gOing to be anything but
an idea.
Wanting to have an a rt that has no inrluenoe in society Is
going against the nature of art itself.
beliers.

All ideas are based on

An art Which is not based in any belief is something to

whioh we do not give any importanoe.

The oonslusion is that mod-

ern art, more than being popular is antipopular. rebel. against
any type

0' sooial dogma on Which it oould be founded.

It 1. not

the mere tact that the masses do not l1ke or understand It, but
tbe tact is

1tha~

artists today want to avold tWe me..ssea with tbet

aame interest with which they avold tbe forms ot nature, Or_ega
says.

This rebelion against the foundations of art Makes art oom-

pletely ludicroup and irrelevant.
ation art is

8.

"For the man of our new gener-

thing without any transoendence. u28 Tbe artist has

renounced to his soclal responsibility.

Be doe. not

~~nt

the ap-

proval of the masse.; he hates to be understood by them because he
does not want art converted In something Importaftt from a sociological viewpOint.

28

Art 18 sool010ilcal1y irrelevant for the first

l2~

time in history.

It does not contribute to any change or atti-

tudes and belieta, as it always did.

On the other hand, .e may

reverse the former statement, saying that art mirrors the general
attitude of puer1lity of our age, thus beooming so010log1cal17
mean1ng.ful.
The young art is not so much ditrernet1cated trom
the old regarding its objects, but rather relarding
,he jubjectlve attitude of the art1st towards art •••
This is the situation in whIch Europe fInds Itself today.
The system of values that was controll1ng Europe thirty
year. ago, bas lost its toroe ot attraction and vigour.
The western man lacks a radical orientation beoause he
does not know to which star turn. 29
.Art haa introduoed us, once more, to the general theme ot
Ortega, the revolt of t he masses against all values and oulture,
and the oODsequent disorientation ot human k1nd.

29artega, Obras 0Gmfletas, III 194 and 19~.

OHAPTEB YI

OOllOLUSIOII
Up to this point our only conoern has been to present an aocount ot the sooiology ot Ortega y Ga.set.

This 1s

wh~,

except

tor a re. remarks directed to clarity a tew obscure points, .e
have intentionally av01ded any personal evaluation and cr1ticis

ot the 80c1010gy we have abstracted and syatematized, so that we
can put Ortega in h1s place 1n the tield ot the sooial aciences.

our

work has been amb1tlous and, to a great extent, can

be expanded.

~d

anould

we could have limited ourselves to the development

ot a tew socl010gloal questions ot ortega.

However, IUch an at-

tempt would have been ot little help tor those who did not bave an
introduotorJ knowledge of Ortega's general sooiology.

In the ab-

sence ot suoh introductorr work we have telt justitied to wrlte
this thesis a. an introduotion to furtherstudles.

And .. hope

that our work did not olose the door tor

looking more

those~o.

tor truth than tor llterary expressions, 'can r1d themselves in order to accept whatever is valuable trom his sociolog1cal wr1ting ••
Now we want to complete that which has been

80

tar a text book or

Ortega-, soc101087, with a personal 1mpre.s10n which Should resped
the synthetl0 torm ot our whole prev10ua .-position.
The bulk

or

the sooiolog1 ot Ortega 1 Ga.aet waa written be.
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tween 1910 and 1930 when sociology was still a new science.

Ex-

cept for his historical knowledge, Ortega did not bring many
methodological improvements into the field of the social sciences4
However, in the level of theory, his contribution was consideration.

The vari*tr of themes and the consistence ot exposition,

prescinding from validity and verification, which we will criticize in a moment, place Ortega's sociology very close to the social work of his contemporary writers.
Ortega'. contained in

!!E ~

pe2Ple

The general sociology ot
is a long and solid treat-

ment which should be included in any text book of 80ciologi.oal
theorf and history of sociological thought.

It is true that his

studies about the sociology of war, law, and scienoe are very
sketchy.

Yet his social study of political phenomena and ot the

social function and origin of myth and ideology (ldeas 1 creencia
cannot be disregarded.
In the present work we have male a general value-judgment
about Ortegats contribution to the different branches of sociology by the importance and length we have given to these different branches.

We have hesitated about wtiting a separate section

with Ortega's sociology of waP and science, but these two fields
can hardly be considered as Indopendent from the SOCiology ot
knowledge of which they are sketohy ramifications.

Nevertheless,

we have written a chapter about Ortega's sooiology of art, for
his social treatment of the latter, though dependent on his gen-

~
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era1 sooiology of knowledge and politioa1 sociology, presents
enough material for those interested in the field.
From another viewpoint the disposition of the subject-matter
of the thesis oan be considered arbitrarl.

Here we have in mtnd

the great logioal oonneotioq4nd developmettt of Ortega's sooiological writings
arbitra~

~&h

we have had to

reorgan~e

ohapters for purpose of oharity.

around somewhat

It is true that Orteg

never did picture himself as a political sociologist of knowledge
The tact of the matter is that

O~tega

wrote political sociology,

sociology of knowledge, etc. Finalll. we have failed in presenting with oomplete faithfulness the logical network o:fOrtega f $.;

'.l

sociological ideas beoause we have preferred organization rather
than argumentation and synthetio oorrelations.

Ortega's

wo~k

to be oonsidered like the pieces ot a maohine whioh oannot,

t,.

stri~

ly speaking, be put together gradatim, but rather·all at once.
The general s ooiologr of our author is the main doctrinal
body to whioh all other social writin&K should be referred.
Ortega, perfeotly acquainted with the sociologists of his time,
set out to write this general treatise, because he believed he
could contribute something new.

However, such a pDrpose seems

to be ambitious and far above his aocomplianment.

We heard him

lal ing:

r shall never forget the surprise mingled with shame
and shock whioh I felt when, many years ago, conscious

-
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of

m:r ignoranoe on this subject. I hurried, full of

illusion, all the sails of hope spread wide, to books
on sooiology ••• and fo,und something incredible--namely
that books on sooiology have nothing clear to sayabout what the social is, about what sooiety is. l
Cert4inly

~ ~

people does not,d1tter too much, presoind-

lng from its literary form, from Dlrkheim t s Rules
Method or from

~~bert

s Theorz

£!

100ial

~

~

.:?ociological

.&oonomic, Organization.

Durkheim, for instano-3, oonsiderssocial facts as independent fro
individual aotivities: "Here, then, is a cat6gory of facts with
very distinctive oharaoteristios: it oonsists in ways of acting,
thinking, and feeling external to the individual, and endowed wit
a power of coercion, by reason of which they -control him." 3 And

Ortega writes: "To judge from what appears hCtre, usages are not
of the Indlv1.dual but or sooiety."4
of sooial

f~ot s

From the two ohar"oterist,iotl

in Durkheim, namely, their ooeroion IUld diffusion,

Ortega stre:ssew mainly the former

and

identifies it with the in-

stitutiOnalization of physioal force: the government.

lOrtega,

~ ~

This ident-

People, p. 13.

2Emi1e Durkheim, The Rules of Sociologioal Method, Tranalated
by So10vary and Mue11.F\New YOl'K; 1958) Max weber, The Theory ot
Soolal and Eoonomio Organization4 Translated by Henderson and Par.
sons (New York, 1947).·
3nurkheim. ~ Rules of Soctiog1c~1.Method, p.

40rtega, ~

!2£ People,

p. 194.

3.
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ifioation of physical force with the government is Ortega's synthesis of Durkheim and weber. 5
Ortegats three levels of human action--the personal, the interpersonal, and the social--make him even more of an exaggerated
realist than Durkheim. 6

In spite of the fact that the subjeot

matter of sociology should be human interaction and therefore
ought

!jOt.

to be liuited to the study of mores and customs (usages

still the three levels of analysis of Ortega are useful oategorie
for social psyohology.
iology

w~~h

Follow,"ng

r:urkh,e~.m,

0rtega Idsntified soc

socI&l psyohology to a great extent.

The three level

of human action of Ortega, as we said before, are abstraotions.
Parti-cularily important among them is his portrait of usages. Usage. correspond very much to what Malinowski oalled the dead ele-

~, and Summer called folkwals.7

--

If we make the subject matter

of sociology oonsist of any type of human interaotion,

Ortega~8

I

charaoterization of the interpersonal level oontains a good exposition of the mllt",:". notos of the' sociologioal unit.

Human inter

.
5Weber, From Max Weber, Translated and edited by 3erth and
Mills (New Yo~~), p. 159.
6Timashetf, sociologioal Theorl, p. 117.
7Bronislaw Malinowski, Scientifio The0

rk of Culture

1944), p.-46; and, Summer, FOlkWays (Rew tor ,-r906).

(New Yor
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aotion, Ortega's oharaoterization of the interpersonal level oontains a good exposition of the main notes of the so01010gioal unitt
Human interaotion, then, aooording to our writer, is meaningfUl,
involves reciprocity, oontingency, 8.nd interpraation. 8

Reoiproclt~

in so far as interaotion implies always another subjeot or point OJ referenoe different from

mine~

Until the Other Man appears on the

-

scene as ."havepointed out before, the here and 'Chere were Ublvocal, now they beoome equivoo.l~9
01"'

Contingenoy beoause the reaotlon

tht'! OthE:Jr Man is unpredictable; and this is the reason for us-

ages; to

p~oteot

us from our mutual foreignels and unpredloabl11ty·

Interpretation, inasmuch as the Other Man is an intus

and we can-

not reaoh him direotly but only through his manifestations.

Body

and intelleot play an important role in this interpretation of the
Other Man.

The former gives us something whioh the latter has to

interpret.

Ortega y GasBet holds that thought is purely instrumen-

tal

and

subordinated to the biologioal level, as we said before.

To a great extent, this instrumentality of thought is a philosophical postulste neoessary for the sooial approach to thought and for
the ideational approaoh to oulture, both of which aspeots are treat",
ed at length in Ortega'. sociology.

However. we cannot agree with

80beerve the similarity with Weber's meaningful action and
oausality, The Theory of Soaial and Economic Organization (New Yor}
1947), pp. '87=124.
-

9pp • 31-32.
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the exagS"eration wi th which Ortega
intellect.

expl~in

s the instrumentality

o~

As in many other instances, this is one of Ortega's

postulates derived from his philosophy which was heavily
enced by the biological findings of his time.
postulates and philosophical

~th

in~lu

regard to such

position one commentor says: "With

regard to the problem of how to emphasize in a correct way the
lm.jJortance of life as oPP9sed to the biological expre ssions of
Ortega could. give greater strength to his arguments than the ont;(,logical a.nd epistemological postulates.

We do not know which

,wa's the specific goal of ortega.

But there is no doubt that he
could not aocep~ a biological interpretation of reason." lO Another
commentsc "His thought seems to ••• adopt expressions openly realis-

tlc ••• Reason. subordinated to life, composes poetry to life. Pure
reason leaves its'plaoe to vital reason ••• His contempt for conceptualizatlons makes him hesitate in front of the threats of relativism."ll

The same difference of interpretation regarding his

philosophical position appears in all other oommentaries of Orteg
The concept of culture of ortega oorresponds to what Weber
called civillza.tion.l2 Ortega's disregard for invention, an.d in
ge~eralt

for any type of non-formal oultural activity restriots

his concept of culture to ideological products.

However, we tind

lOperrater Mora, ~ filosofia ~ Ortega I Gasset, pp. 39-40.
llJoae Sanohez Villasenor,

~

Ortega

Z Gassett

p.

74.

l2Robert Merton, "Civilization and Culture,tt sooiologl and
Social Research (~93b), pp. 104, 109.
---
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ver,y similar definitions of oulture among the old anthropologistst
Ortega's expositions of the origin of oulture and its connection
with usages are penetrating and rioh; they express in a definitiv
fashion what ocoupies entire .works of anthropology.

We have part

ioularly in mind a number of good observations about human behavi
or,14 and about sooial elements. ttTeohnique,

1t

says Ortega, "i. th

adaptation of the environment to the individual instead of the in
dividual to the environment.,,15 And we say how this simple observ
ation is what distinguishes animal from human behavior.
ception of man as an organism which, even

i~tellectu.lly,

The conneeds

the stimuli of the world around him, as something that belongs to
the very nature of this organism is also stressed by Toynbee. 16
If we rid all thesen oonceptions of their possibly false philosophical postulates, they can reorientate our research in social
p.,.chology.
Ortega unites the units of the different 30cial soienoes wit
too muoh readiness.

Bowever, his general soheme

o~

sooial, cul-

tural, and political aotion offers the possibility of an organlza
tion of theories and findings in these different fields.

Ortega'

13"culture or civilization ••• is that oomplex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, oustom and any other
capabili ties and habits acquired by ma.n as a member of sooiety,"
Mor~an, Primitive Culture, from Timasheff, Sociological Theo~,
p. 49. SimIlarly, p. 67.
14we refer to the distinction bet.een man and animal behavio
for instance, a theme that Malinowski explains in a very similar
way. Malinowski, Soientific Theory of culture, (New York,1944)p.
{t,0rtega, Obras Com leiiaa, V, (1955), p. 326.
ologists:

f!

filoaofia

.2!.

Ortega 1. Gasset, p. 45.

grand theory, whether to reject or acoept, should be conaid.red
aa the product ot

8.

deep understanding o( soclal phenomena.

Thls

1. Dot on17 oorroboratjd b7 the impre.aioll whioh hi. wr1 tings oau••

ed at the time, but m.'u17 b7 the aooura07of the prediotions ot
Ortega. Most of the problema which

o~r

aooial soene oontaina 'oda7

were envisaged at the beginning ot

ta.

oenttlQ' by orte'p..17

Importance should be siv.n to the historical studies ot Ort ••
gas, and espeolal,ly to what we have dalled ti.4& histor1eal rh7tblna.
Hls ideological an4 oultural approaoh to bia.torlcal taota i. part!cul.rly relevant in suoh areas of researoh as war, law, 800ial
movementa, etc. The h1storical so0101087 ot Orbega could otter
enough subjeot .atter to anyone intere.ted in writing
Care should be taken, however, that we pre,oind tram

8.

m.onogx-aph.

8. a~at

of merely liteztary or philosophical digr.8s10ns_ Ort.ga

f.

v••~

dootrine

ot the point of vi ... Is similar to the relatlonlsm of Mannheim,

aile

a.ema to be a oonsequenoe of his historiola=_ All these problema
should be treated more extensively beoaus. they touch i...."on the dtt..
fleu1t pro.l.. ot the oonfliot b.t....n aociol08' •• 1 and philosophioal commitments.

M&DDhelmt a ES_Z! lathe

SocIo!~!!!

1"011'1.4,.,.

and stt'lrlr't. 80c10lo8'1 ot .Knowledge treat this problem at lenstll.

an~

with depth. 18
p. 71:7Marla.,. ,hilo.ophel' espagnolee ~ notre tess (Paris, 1954),

by

18stark, Th~ socIology 2.!. I'no;-l.dje q.on4on, 1958) pp. 16~
~,~annheim, Essays on tne 80Cloloc;y 01 knowledGe, /r'anslated
Pauls l'~ecsker.'~eti (LODCOi.1;-l"959) p. 27b.

l~~

The main thesis of Ortega'a political sooioloty is his oonception of political facta as

mer~

reflection of social structure

It is interesting to notice how Tocqueville, whose work
the most olassical pol1tical werks, places the cause of many pol!
tical realitIes in the po11t1cal institutions and political attitudes of the people. We do not mean to

8AY

that Tocquevllle'a the

orr is not perfectly valid within aome limits or determinate level of explanation.
quir~d

But a more profound

by oorrelating

soci~l

underst~di~g

institutions

and

can be a-

attitudes with pol-

itical facts.

Ortega gives us a key for this type of approach to
po~ical phenomena. l 9 Merton's manifest and latent funotions can
help us to better grasp Ortega's idea of the role of beliefs and
ideas; of the nature of the common plan that oonstitutes the nation,

and

the role of the minority in society.20

appro-stem would try to verify

ju~t

The functional

how much these sooial dogmas
,

are the real independent variables of cultural and p01tlcal oh
or .ather mere rationalizations of deeper factors.
out before, Ortega is

an

As we pointed

ideological determinist. 21 ~. 80oiolo-

gi st s in thi s country tend to take .the opPolli te approach: "III
studying the ideas in sooial movements,.. shall' take them all

190rtega t S Revolt of the Masses expresses l:l0.~·~ of the c,.,nt:-a
ideas of Tooquevil1e .bout~e strong desire for equality in Amer
ioa. Tocquevil1e.
2oMerton, Social Theory ~ Sooial structure (Glenooe, 1959)

p. 19.·.
2
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proolamations of aims and as expressions of will.

r~ther

than ••

statements of economic or political truth, n says Heberle .22 HowEI'VIr
Orte":s. eave to the term idea a very wide sense. In hie studies about teohnlc1Jl
nee1$

~s

p:rogreE'~:

fnr 1nstance, he presents the biological

Recondary with regard to their intelleotual justification.

H.writes: ftMan does not want to die, on the oontrary he wants to
survive ••• but why does man ""'ant to survive instead of' ceasing to
exist?" 23 He says that the instinct of conservation is not a good
explanation because many people

ch~ose

death sometimes.

The result

of all this is the basic-----.
Ortega y Gasset simplif'led too much his social approach to pol
it:!.cal phenomena by making the state identical with the nation, or
SOCiety.

Sooiety and state are different eveqkhough one might not

exist without the other.

Furthermore, there is a laok of termino-

logy to distinguish Government from

~tate

when necessary.

Inthe

coUrse of our exposition we tried to avoid such terminology beoause
our author never bothered about

t~is

problem.

A good resutt of Ortega's cultural approaoh to politioal fao'.

--- - ---.;;;.. Leaving aside the numerous rhetorical and literary expressions of this work, we must aois his study of the Revolt of the MassElS.

knowledge the inrluence thAt it has had upon contemporary political
~henomena,

especially in reference to political ideologies.

All

22Heberel, Soolal Movement, Appleton, century Crofts, p. 12.
23Ortega, Obras Completas V (Madrid,

1955), 3-82.

135
All theee studies are of great importance in our world of political and ideological struggle.

Riesman's Lonely Crowd is very sim

ilar in approach to the political works of Ortega and offers a
great deal of parallel points with the former. 25 The general char
acter of the revolt of the masses is treated in Riesman, and the
other-directed and

~nslde

dopester have more than one similarity

, 26

W1th Ortega's "'ss-man.

Ortega's definition of nation as a dynamic reality is especially relevant from a sociological point of view.

Such a theory

oan be dynamios and social ohange and deviance. 27
Finally Ortega, by carrylng man.,. ot his ideas about myth and
~d.ol~gi.s

into the realm of pol1tlo.l sociology, of tel's us a typ

of weltanschauung of our age that,a.cording to Mannhelm should be
the maIn aIm of the solology of knowledge. Mannhelm went
a, to state, tho
"

I

1,mpos~ibllfty

eft'

'0 far

pol! tical science without the

~;

preliminary bases ot the sociology of knowledge. 28
;;4,:

WIth regard to Ortegats sociology of knowledge, it is significant that most of his sources are identical with those of Mannhelm.

Ortega t s' oate,orles, in this field of sociology, show a

sociological interest, rather than a phil••ophioal one.

we have

pointed out this faot before, when we were dealing with the dis-

25 nav id Rieeman, !2! Lonell Crowd (New York, 1953).
26 Ibid ., PP. ;4, 191-260.
fore,

27Here we have mainly in mind the works already mentioned be~ ,Sorokin, ~arsons, and Merton.

tinction o£ Mannheim between ideology and utopia and Ortega's beliefs and ideas.
Ortega's terminology,

ho\~ver,

is marksdly subjective, and

re£lects a great deal o£ his anti-religio•• feelings.

The terms

revelation, faith, belief, when applied to social phenomena are
not only inadequate but they indicate bad tast•• 29
However, i ' we do not
lo~e.l

p~

too mpch attention to the termino-

aspeot, the facts expressed by Ortega's terminology and

their hierarchical organization are to

b. considered.

Perhaps to

many, Ortega might appear too theoretical and even vague; but suCh
an accusation could as well be directed to the sociology of knowleQge. »ow we have written a few pages trying to present our views
in regard to such an accuaation.
In spite of his philosophical commitments, Ortega's studies

of beliefs and ideas, of sooial doubts, social reorientation and
change, are based on a great deal of historical research.

Mannhei~

gave us tllB general theory of' the relationship of political ideologie. and parties to 800ial group. and classes.

Ortega foouse.

his sociology of knowledge around the problem of ideologioal

cha~

Decadenoe, progress, and sensibility of' an age are explained in
terms of' the change of ideas into beliets and vice versa.

Here,

we must insist once more, the hypothetical character of this field

29 0n November 24, 1950, Ortega made this announcement 'in a
public theatre: "r announce that the Catholic Church is going to
get rid of Aristotle and ~. Thomas and that a new ~heo16gy will be
Quilt in connection with the Holy ~athers."Granerol~Ortega y Gasset
en al cine Barcelo," Raxon y Fe, CXLI llqi)Ol i8q~

of sociology permeates Ortega's Ideas and Beliefs.
Finally Ortega t s theory of art as portRait in his

f.!

deshumall

izacion del arte, must, one we get rid of his applications to mod-----ern art, constitute a well for further research and theory in
thi~

new field of knowledge. Although some art critics have shown little sympathy for the criticism of modern art of ortega. yet, implicitely in this work of Ortega, we find all the sociological
bases for a sociology of art.
ortega's great qualities as an art critic and his sooio-histori cal knowledge help him to understand the social nature of art.
As far

a~

his essay,

critioism goes, we

1!

sho~

deshumanizacion

~

consider the literary form of
artei the paradoxes and exagger-

ated statements of this work have to be understood in the lIght of
our introduotion. Aranguren, a great disciple of Ortega writeal"It
is fairly known that Ortega evaluatia very much the exaggeration
because of its expressiveness and ostantation, and, so to speak,
its pedagogio power. n30
~hat

is more diffioult to reconsile, is a contradiction that

seems to lie beneath the whole interpretation of modern art when
it is judged on the basis, of Ortega.s general sociology of knowiedge.

Ortega claims that knowledge, within a sooiologioal oon-

text, is partioularly oreative in art and science.

. 3OJos e Luis de Aranguren,

1958) J p. 19.

From this poin

f!!. Et10a ~ Ortega, Taurus, (Madrid.

of view, the essay of Ortega about modern art, should be prior,

------ -- --- -----of the former essay were

logically at least, to his Revolt of the Masses.
not only the main ideas
the

~evolt

£f

~

But we know that
formulated after

Masses, but also thst his sociological interpret

ation of modern art implies, as an

~

prior scheme, his political

and social outlook to the mass-movements of our age. If the 800iocultural views of any age can and should be discovered, in the
first place, :1.n art ano science, Ortega.'s Deshumanizacion del arte

--

should be prior to his political work.

This seems to prove that

Ortegats interpretation of modern art is biased by his sooial outlook to modern times.
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